An Existential Crisis: The State And Future Of The European Union by Magee, Katherine L.
	 	 	 	
	 									AN	EXISTENTIAL	CRISIS:		THE	STATE	AND	FUTURE	OF	THE	EUROPEAN	UNION					Katherine	L.	Magee				TC	660H	Plan	II	Honors	Program	The	University	of	Texas	at	Austin		 		May	4th,	2017		 				__________________________________________	Dr.	Linda	Gerber	Center	for	Global	Business,	Marketing	Supervising	Professor					__________________________________________	Dr.	Michael	Mosser	Center	for	European	Studies,	International	Relations	and	Global	Governance,	Government	Second	Reader		
	 2	 	 	
ABSTRACT		
Author:		Katherine	L.	Magee		
Title:		An	Existential	Crisis:	The	State	and	Future	of	the	European	Union		
Supervising	Professors:	Dr.	Linda	Gerber,	Dr.	Michael	Mosser		 For	more	than	a	half	century,	the	European	Union	(EU)	has	contributed	to	unprecedented	levels	of	peace	and	economic	prosperity	in	Europe.	Unfortunately,	the	success	of	the	EU	in	these	areas	has	been	undervalued	as	the	memory	of	World	War	II	has	faded.	Additionally,	there	has	been	a	significant	rise	in	Euroscepticism	over	the	past	decade	as	the	EU	has	fallen	dramatically	short	of	expectations	when	addressing	the	economic	recession	and	debt	crisis,	the	refuges	crisis,	and	terrorism.	These	issues	bring	to	light	underlying	weaknesses	in	the	input	legitimacy	and	output	legitimacy	of	the	EU.	The	challenges	in	achieving	input	legitimacy	and	output	legitimacy	has	led	the	EU	to	a	truly	existential	crisis,	as	many	doubt	if	the	EU	can	continue	to	survive	in	its	current	form.	The	future	of	the	EU	depends	on	some	external	factors	beyond	its	control	(the	Russian	threat,	the	global	economy,	the	French	and	German	elections,	and	the	fate	of	the	UK	as	it	attempts	to	leave	the	EU),	but	its	future	also	depends	on	the	steps	the	EU	takes	to	restore	its	input	legitimacy	and	output	legitimacy.	First,	the	EU	must	take	effective	actions	to	show	its	value	on	a	large	and	personal	scale	to	restore	its	output	legitimacy.	Second,	the	EU	must	address	underlying	concerns	of	detachment,	identity,	and	its	purpose.	Finally,	the	measures	the	EU	takes	to	restore	its	output	legitimacy	and	build	its	input	legitimacy	must	be	effectively	and	accurately	communicated	to	the	people.		 		 	
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CHAPTER	1:	THE	EXISTENTIAL	CRISIS	OF	THE	EUROPEAN	UNION	In	March	of	2017,	the	European	Commission,	the	executive	arm	of	the	European	Union	(EU),	published	a	white	paper	on	the	Future	of	Europe.	For	the	first	time	in	its	history,	the	European	Union	expressed	uncertainty	about	its	future.	The	meaning,	purpose,	and	value	of	the	EU	are	all	being	questioned	at	unprecedented	levels,	such	that	its	very	existence	is	being	challenged.	For	many,	the	possibility	that	the	European	Union	will	disband	is	becoming	ever	more	possible.	Those	who	are	optimistic	about	the	European	Union	maintain	hope	that	the	European	Union	will	resolve	its	existential	crisis	by	finding	new	strength	from	unity	and	promoting	further	integration.	While	the	future	of	the	EU	is	far	from	clear,	it	is	undeniable	that	something	must	change	for	the	EU	as	is	truly	is	in	an	existential	crisis.	The	existential	crisis	of	the	European	Union	is	largely	due	to	a	decrease	in	its	perceived	legitimacy	by	the	people	and	member	states	it	governs	(see	Appendix	8).	Democratic	governments,	such	as	the	European	Union,	rely	on	the	people	recognizing	the	government’s	legitimacy,	which	is	defined	as	“the	people’s	recognition	and	acceptance	of	the	validity	of	the	rules	of	their	entire	political	system	and	the	decisions	of	their	rulers.”	Legitimacy	can	be	broken	down	into	input	legitimacy	and	output	legitimacy.	Input	legitimacy	is	based	on	the	process	in	which	rules	are	adopted.	A	democratic	governing	body	possesses	input	legitimacy	if	its	process	is	generally	viewed	as	fair	and	representative	of	the	people.	The	second	form	of	legitimacy	is	output	legitimacy,	which	is	based	on	the	impact	and	effectiveness	of	the	rules	and	policies	the	governing	body	implements.	A	
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government	has	output	legitimacy	if	it	is	viewed	as	being	effective	in	creating	and	enforcing	laws	that	ultimately	benefit	society.1		First,	it	is	necessary	to	address	the	increasing	doubt	about	the	input	legitimacy	of	the	EU.	The	EU	was	founded	after	World	War	II	under	the	idea	that	increased	economic	integration	would	lead	to	peace	and	solidarity	within	Europe.	By	most	regards,	the	EU	has	succeeded	at	facilitating	economic	integration	and	promoting	peace	within	Europe.	In	fact,	the	EU	seems	to	have	become	a	victim	of	its	own	success	because	the	longstanding	peace	seems	to	have	caused	many	to	doubt	the	necessity	of	the	EU.	As	the	memory	of	World	War	II	has	faded,	the	narrative	of	the	necessity	of	the	EU	for	peace	within	Europe	has	lost	power.	The	idea	of	war	within	Europe	seems	almost	unimaginable	for	those	who	never	experienced	World	War	II,	such	that	the	necessity	of	the	EU	for	peace	seems	almost	absurd.	As	a	result,	the	reason	and	necessity	for	the	existence	of	the	EU	is	unclear.	Today,	some	appear	to	see	the	EU	as	an	economic	entity,	whereas	others	view	the	EU	in	ideological	terms	as	a	champion	for	European	values,	and	others	simple	view	the	EU	as	a	vehicle	for	free	movement	in	Europe.2	There	is	no	common	understanding	of	the	purpose	of	the	EU,	and	the	original	justification	of	promoting	peace	seems	largely	lost.	Moreover,	a	sense	of	European	identity	comes	second	to	national	identity,	which	creates	an	obstacle	for	European	integration	through	the	European	Union	and	the	lack	of	a	common	European	identity	weakens	feelings	of	solidarity	between	member	states.	National	identities	have	been	prioritized	throughout	history	with	stories	of	national	history	and	heroes;	furthermore,	national	education,	which	prioritizes	the	history	of	the	specific	state	over	a	
																																																								1	Weiler,	Joseph	H.	H.	"In	the	Face	of	Crisis:	Input	Legitimacy,	Output	Legitimacy	and	the	Political	Messianism	2	European	Commission.	Standard	Eurobarometer	85-	Spring	2015-	Public	opinion	in	the	European	Union.	May	2016.	Accessed	January	27,	2017.	
	 7	 	 	
common	European	history,	also	contributes	to	national	identities	having	a	greater	strength	than	a	common	European	identity.	Finally,	there	is	a	high	degree	of	detachment	between	the	European	Union	and	the	European	citizens	it	serves.	This	sense	of	detachment	is	due	partly	to	a	democratic	deficit	in	the	structure	of	the	EU,	but	largely	related	to	an	emotional	detachment	stemming	from	a	perception	that	the	technocratic	officials	of	the	EU	are	removed	from	the	problems	of	a	common	European.	All	of	these	factors	cause	the	EU	to	have	low	levels	of	input	legitimacy.		Not	only	is	the	EU	suffering	from	doubt	about	its	input	legitimacy,	but	it	also	suffers	from	high	levels	of	doubt	doubt	about	its	output	legitimacy.	People	no	longer	believe	that	the	EU	has	the	ability	to	deliver	results	to	make	their	lives	better,	as	it	has	failed	to	effectively	respond	to	key	issues	that	have	arisen	in	Europe	over	the	past	decade.	Economic	concerns	due	to	the	2008	financial	crisis	and	the	resulting	European	debt	crisis	initially	sparked	concerns	that	have	only	grown	as	the	recovery	progressed	at	a	slower	pace	than	desired.	Moreover,	the	recent	refugee	crisis	in	European	has	raised	concerns	about	migration	to	and	within	Europe.	Finally,	the	increasing	frequency	of	terrorist	attacks	on	European	soil	has	raised	fears	over	security	and	open	borders.	To	date,	the	European	Union	has	failed	to	effectively	respond	to	these	crises	effectively	and	in	a	way	that	resonates	with	European	citizens,	causing	its	output	legitimacy	to	fall	under	a	high	degree	of	scrutiny.	When	the	EU	does	succeed	at	creating	laws	to	respond	to	issues,	the	EU	has	difficulty	enforcing	these	laws	as	enforcement	depends	on	member	states.	Even	when	the	EU	succeeds	at	creating	and	enforcing	laws	to	solve	problems,	it	rarely	gets	credit	for	its	successes	as	it	has	limited	communication	channels	with	European	citizens.		Compounding	this	is	the	fact	that	national	governments	fail	to	give	the	EU	credit	for	its	successes	when	
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they	can	claim	success	for	themselves.	As	a	result,	the	EU	has	low	levels	of	actual	and	perceived	output	legitimacy.		Combined,	these	sentiments	on	the	input	and	output	legitimacy	of	the	EU	have	led	to	dramatic	increases	in	Euroscepticism	in	recent	years.	Euroscepticism	is	generally	known	as	“the	opposition	and	doubt	to	the	process	of	European	integration,”	largely	with	reference	to	the	European	Union	itself.3	Euroscepticism	has	existed	for	the	history	of	the	EU,	but	is	has	escalated	over	the	past	decade	due	to	the	aforementioned	events,	as	well	as	the	advancement	and	spread	of	technology	which	facilitates	the	dissemination	of	minority,	extremist,	or	anti-establishment	views.4	In	fact,	there	are	two	distinct	branches	of	Euroscepticism.	The	first	of	which	is	“hard”	Euroscepticism,	which	consists	of	“a	principled	opposition	to	the	EU	and	European	integration	and	therefore	can	be	seen	in	parties	who	think	that	their	counties	should	withdraw	from	membership,	or	whose	policies	towards	the	EU	are	tantamount	to	being	opposed	to	the	whole	project	of	European	integration	as	it	is	currently	conceived.”5	This	branch	of	Euroscepticism,	which	the	French	National	Front	party	largely	champions,	is	the	most	concerning	for	the	EU;	but,	“soft”	Euroscepticism	can	also	be	threatening	as	it	has	the	potential	to	spread	and	transform	into	hard	Euroscepticism.	Soft	Euroscepticism	is	“not	a	principled	objection	to	European	integration	or	EU	membership	but	where	concerns	on	one	(or	a	number)	of	policy	areas	lead	to	the	expression	of	qualified	opposition	to	the	EU,	or	where	there	is	a	sense	that	’national	
																																																								3	Taggart,	P.	(1998).	“A	Touchstone	of	Dissent:	Euroscepticism	in	Contemporary	W	4	Euroscepticism	can	be	seen	through	the	context	of	a	global	increase	in	anti-establishment	views.	The	European	Union	can	be	seen	as	the	“establishment”	composed	of	the	political	elite	who	can	be	viewed	as	disconnected	from	the	common	man.	As	a	result,	as	anti-establishment	views	spread,	they	can	fuel	Eurosceptic	sentiments.	5	Taggart	P.;	Szczerbiakk,	A.	(2002).	“The	Party	Politics	of	Euroscepticism	in	EU	Member	and	Candidate	States”,	‘Opposing	Europe	Research	Network’	Working	Paper,	No.6,	pp.	1-45.	
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interest’	is	currently	at	odds	with	the	EU’s	trajectory.”6	While	these	are	two	distinct	beliefs,	both	fall	under	the	umbrella	term	of	Euroscepticism	and	pose	a	danger	to	the	EU,	so	they	will	be	addressed	simply	as	Euroscepticism.			Euroscepticism	must	also	be	viewed	in	the	greater	context	of	globalization.	As	the	world	becomes	increasingly	intertwined	economically,	there	are	winners	and	losers	in	the	short	term	as	markets	adjust	to	align	with	efficiency.	For	many,	this	transition	has	led	to	an	increase	in	nationalism,	as	other	nations	seem	to	pose	a	threat	to	the	economic	status	quo	of	a	country.	Nationalism	is	becoming	increasingly	relevant	when	considering	the	European	Union,	as	it	can	pose	a	threat	to	supranationalism	(a	governing	body	over	individual	nation	states)	if	national	interests	conflict	with	the	supranationalist	agenda7.	Nationalism	holds	that	an	“individual’s	loyalty	and	devotion	to	the	nation-state	surpass	all	other	groups	or	interests.”8	This	implies	that	a	state	must	have	primary	identification	with	its	people.	Nationalism	is	based	on	an	in-group	versus	out-group	mentality,	which	makes	integration	impossible	unless	all	parties	identify	as	members	of	the	same	group	above	all	other	groups.		This	analysis	is	rooted	in	Tajfel’s	Social	Identity	Theory,	which	states	that	the	“in-group	will	discriminate	against	the	out-group	to	enhance	their	self-image.”9	Once	an	identity	is	established	that	identifies	the	nation	as	the	in-group,	then	individuals	(and,	by	extension	the	government	through	democratic	processes)	will	prioritize	the	state	above	other	European	states,	such	that	other	European	states	will	be	viewed	as	threats,	
																																																								6	Taggart	P.;	Szczerbiakk,	A.	(2002).	7	Nationalism	is	not	the	same	as	Euroscepticism.	It	is	possible	to	be	both	very	in	favor	of	nationalism	and	very	in	favor	of	the	European,	as	Scotland	tends	to	exhibit	both	of	these	traits.	However,	nationalism	often	coincides	with	Euroscepticism	as	national	interests	often	come	in	conflict	the	supranationalist	goals.		8	"Nationalism."	Encyclopedia	Britannica	Online.	Accessed	November	27,	2016.	https://www.britannica.com/topic/nationalism.		9	McLeod,	Saul.	“Social	Identity	Theory.”	Simply	Psychology,	2008.	Accessed	December	29,	2016.	http://www.simplypsychology.org/social-identity-theory.html		
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competition,	or	simply	secondary.	When	the	issues	of	that	nation	are	perfectly	aligned	with	the	greater	interests	of	Europe,	this	mindset	may	not	be	an	issue.	But,	when	the	perceived	interests	of	that	nation	are	in	conflict	(or	simply	appear	to	be	in	conflict	with	the	interests	of	Europe,	as	in	a	tragedy	of	the	commons	scenario),	supranationalist	efforts	will	be	challenged,	if	not	prevented,	when	nationalism	takes	hold.	Nationalism	is	not	necessarily	synonymous	with	Euroscepticism.	It	is	feasible	that	a	country	can	be	very	pro-nationalist,	but	also	in	favor	of	European	integration	if	it	is	viewed	as	benefiting	the	country;	however,	nationalism	frequently	aligns	with	Eurosceptic	views	as	any	other	nation,	even	other	European	nations,	can	be	viewed	as	economically	threatening	to	the	prosperity	of	the	nation	in	question.	Within	Europe,	these	nationalist	sentiments	seem	to	be	leading	not	only	to	anti-globalist	views,10	but	also	largely	to	Eurosceptic	views	as	other	European	nations,	and	by	extension	the	European	Union,	may	be	viewed	as	a	threat	to	national	interests.		
THEORIES	OF	EUROPEAN	INTEGRATION	In	order	to	fully	understand	the	existential	crisis	of	the	EU,	it	is	necessary	to	understand	not	only	the	Eurosceptic	views	and	their	reasons,	but	also	to	understand	the	process	of	European	integration.	There	are	five	main	theories	that	attempt	to	explain	European	integration:	federalism,	functionalism,	neofunctionalism,	intergovernmentalism,	and	liberal	governmentalism.			 Federalism	is	perhaps	the	most	extreme	method	of	European	integration,	approaching	integration	as	a	way	of	ultimately	combining	sovereignty	from	individual	states.	It	calls	for	a	constitution	under	which	previously	independent	actors	fully	integrate,	similar	to	the	model	of	states	within	the	United	States	government.	Federalism	was	quickly																																																										
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viewed	as	too	extreme	as	it	would	be	a	threat	to	national	sovereignty,	as	European	nations	desired	some	degree	of	sovereignty.		Following	the	rejection	of	federalism,	functionalism	developed.	Functionalism	holds	that	as	the	world	became	more	economically	interconnected	following	the	industrial	revolution,	the	common	interests	of	states	triggered	integration	because	the	high	degree	of	economic	connection	created	problems	that	could	only	be	resolved	by	means	of	inter-state	or	supranational	cooperation.	1112	David	Mitrany	was	a	prominent	functionalist,	who	“advocated	the	creation	of	a	range	of	similarly	constituted	technical	and	scientific	agencies	with	potentially	global	reach	to	implement	infrastructure	and	reconstruction	programs,	organized	on	a	technical	or	functional	basis	rather	than	on	a	territorial	basis.”13			 Neofunctionalism,	proposed	by	Ernst	Haas	in	1958	in	his	book	The	Uniting	of	Europe,	rises	from	the	basic	beliefs	of	functionalism.14	Neofunctionalism	builds	on	functionalism,	arguing	that	limited	integration	from	functionalism	then	creates	pressures	for	further	integration,	as	the	socioeconomic	problems	of	today’s	world	cannot	be	solved	by	individual	states,	rather	they	require	solution	enacted	by	all	relevant	parties,	such	that	integration	arises	from	functional	necessity.15		In	the	context	of	the	EU,	neofunctionalism	argues	that	the	only	way	to	effectively	respond	to	the	issues	Europe	is	facing	today	would	be	at	a	supranational	level	through	the	EU,	as	individual	nation	states	acting	in	a	disjointed	fashion	would	be	utterly	incapable	of																																																									11	Arzheimer,	Kai.	Theories	of	European	Integration:	EU	Integration	after	Lisbon.	University	of	Mainz.	Accessed	November	27,	2016.	http://www.kai-arzheimer.com/Political-Integration-EU/eu-7-print.pdf.		12	Meyers,	Reinhard.	Theories	of	European	Integration	I.	University	of	Muenster.	Accessed	November	27,	2016.			http://testpolitics.pbworks.com/w/page/25854032/Liberal%20Intergovernmentalism	13	“Functionalism:	International	Relations.”	Encyclopedia	Britannica.	Accessed	December	1,	2016.	https://www.britannica.com/topic/functionalism-international-organizations	14	Haas,	Ernst	B.	The	Uniting	of	Europe:	Political,	Social,	and	Economic	Forces,	1950-1957.	Stanford,	CA:	Stanford	University	Press,	1958.	15	Haas,	Arzheimer,	and	Meyers.		
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responding	to	the	issues	effectively.	16	Ernst	Haas	took	this	view,	writing	during	the	time	when	the	European	Coal	and	Steel	Community	became	absorbed	into	the	European	Community.	Haas	pointed	to	this	evolution,	and	argued	that	such	a	transition	was	evidence	in	favor	of	the	creation	of	supranational	entities	as	they	had	“power	to	redirect	the	loyalties	and	expectations	of	political	actors.”17	Hoffman’s	theory	of	intergovernmentalism,	proposed	in	The	State	of	War:	Essays	on	the	Theory	and	Practice	of	International	Politics,18	challenges	Haas’s	theory	of	neofunctionalism,	opposing	the	idea	that	further	integration	is	inevitable	and	necessary.	Instead,	intergovernmentalism	argues	that	primary	power	lies	with	national	governments	as	they	gained	legal	sovereignty	over	their	individual	countries.19	Consequently,	nations	have	much	greater	independence	and	sovereignty	when	viewed	through	the	lens	of	intergovernmentalism,	such	that	integration	will	and	should	only	happen	to	the	degree	that	national	governments	desire	it	to	occur.	20	Moravcsik	built	on	the	initial	theory	of	intergovernmentalism	in	his	book	The	Choice	for	Europe,21	where	he	proposed	an	the	theory	of	liberal	intergovernmentalism,	in	which	there	is	no	entity	superior	to	the	state.	22	He	argued	that	states	entered	into	international	negotiations	largely	guided	by	their	individual	economic	interests,	and	that	states	will	only	allow	integration	if	it	yields	economic	benefits	while	still	supporting	the	political	survival	of	
																																																								16	Meyers		17	Haas,	Ernst.		18	Hoffman,	Stanley.	The	State	of	War:	Essays	on	the	Theory	and	Practice	of	International	Politic.	1965.		19	Hoffman.	20	Arzheimer,	Meyers,	and	“Liberal	Intergovernmentalism”	21	Moravcsik,	Andrew.	The	Choice	for	Europe:	Social	Purpose	and	State	Power	from	Messina	to	Maastricht.	Ithaca,	NY:	Cornell	University	Press,	1998.		22	Moravcsik,	A.,	Schimmelfennig,	F.	(2009)	Liberal	Intergovernmentalism.	In:	Diez,	T.,	Wiener,	A.,	(2009)	European	Integration	Theory,	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press	pp.	67	-	87	
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the	individual	state.23	Other	benefits	might	also	factor	into	the	analysis,	but	Moravcsik	believed	that	economic	interest	were	of	paramount	concern	for	states.	Given	asymmetries	of	information	and	power,	Moravcsik	also	argued	that	“negotiations	would	imitate	the	power	of	the	states	taking	part,	and	that	states	allowing	supranational	bodies	to	make	decisions	were	attempting	to	ensure	that	all	members	would	abide	by	these	decisions.	This	rejected	confidence	in	the	effectiveness	of	these	organisations	and	also	federalist	ideology.”24	In	essence,	this	view	prioritizes	the	bargaining	power	of	states	and	the	negotiation	process.	The	supranational	institution	itself	is	solely	significant	because	the	entity	can	ensure	that	the	commitments	made	between	the	states	would	be	followed	through	as	promised.	These	five	theories	all	approach	European	integration	through	a	different	perspective	on	the	forces	of	integration	and	the	relative	power	of	the	member	states	compared	to	the	supranational	entity.	These	theories	are	relevant	for	the	existential	crisis	of	the	EU,	as	part	of	this	crisis	relates	to	the	balance	of	power	between	the	EU	and	its	member	states,	as	well	as	the	level	of	integration	required.	The	two	most	popular	understandings	of	European	integration	today	seem	to	be	neofunctionalism	and	liberal	intergovernmentalism.	Neofunctionalism	argues	that	further	integration	is	beyond	the	power	of	individual	states,	as	it	is	driven	by	economic	integration	and	other	factors	that	create	problems	that	can	only	be	solved	at	a	supranational	level.	On	the	other	hand,	liberal	intergovernmentalism	argues	that	supranationalism	is	solely	driven	by	the	individual	states,	which	ultimately	maintain	the	power.	Europe	itself	has	to	work	through	this	conflict																																																									23	"Liberal	Intergovernmentalism."	Accessed	November	27,	2016.	http://testpolitics.pbworks.com/w/page/25854032/Liberal%20Intergovernmentalism		(also	Azheimer	and	Meyers)	 24	"Liberal	Intergovernmentalism”		
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over	the	reasons	and	driving	forces	behind	integration,	as	uncertainty	over	the	understanding	of	European	integration	only	fuels	the	existential	crisis	the	EU	finds	itself	in	today.	Europe	must	decide	if	it	wants	to	give	states	the	primary	power	over	European	integration	or	if	the	EU	claim	the	power	to	promote	further	integration.		
AN	OVERVIEW	This	paper	will	begin	by	exploring	the	history	of	the	development	of	the	European	Union	in	order	to	understand	background	of	the	European	Union	today.	From	there,	this	paper	will	describe	the	structure	of	the	European	Union	today	and	will	investigate	public	opinion	on	the	European	Union.	The	data	from	the	public	opinion	on	the	EU	will	then	be	connected	the	input	legitimacy	and	output	legitimacy	of	the	European	Union.			There	will	then	be	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	key	political	issues	in	Europe	today	and	how	these	issues	impact	public	perception	of	the	EU.	There	will	also	be	a	discussion	of	outside	factors	that	are	also	significant	for	the	future	of	the	EU.	This	paper	will	specifically	use	case	studies	on	the	United	Kingdom,	France,	and	Germany	to	understand	how	the	top	political	issues	in	Europe	contribute	to	an	increase	in	Euroscepticism.	These	three	countries	will	be	used	for	the	study,	as	they	have	historically	been	the	most	powerful	countries	in	the	EU,	so	their	sentiments	on	the	EU	are	of	utmost	importance	for	the	future	of	the	European	Union.			 The	paper	will	conclude	by	analyzing	the	significance	of	the	rise	of	Euroscepticism	for	the	future	of	Europe.	There	will	be	a	discussion	of	the	five	futures	proposed	by	the	European	Commission,	as	well	as	an	exploration	of	the	potential	for	the	EU	to	dismantle.	Based	on	these	possibilities,	there	will	be	an	analysis	of	which	future	is	the	most	likely.	The	insight	gathered	on	the	nature	of	the	legitimacy	crisis	for	Europe	from	previous	sections	
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will	then	be	synthesized	and	solutions	to	these	issues	will	be	proposed.	Finally,	there	will	be	a	discussion	on	why	the	European	Union	is	significant	both	within	Europe	and	on	a	global	scale,	as	recognizing	the	importance	of	the	EU	is	essential	for	its	future.	
	 	
	 16	 	 	
CHAPTER	2:	BACKGROUND	ON	THE	EUROPEAN	UNION	In	order	to	analyze	the	significance	of	a	European	identity	as	it	relates	to	the	European	Union	(EU),	it	is	first	necessary	to	gain	an	understanding	of	the	EU	itself.	This	includes	detailing	the	creation	and	development	of	the	European	Union	as	well	as	describing	the	purpose,	goals,	and	vision	behind	the	Union.		Following	a	high-level	description	and	analysis	of	the	EU,	one	can	gain	a	better	understanding	of	the	EU	as	it	stands	today,	including	its	current	structure	and	all	relevant	political	institutions.	From	there,	the	paper	will	address	public	opinion	on	the	European	Union	today,	as	this	is	necessary	to	understanding	the	legitimacy	crisis	that	the	EU	faces.			
THE	HISTORY	OF	THE	EUROPEAN	UNION		 The	European	Union	of	t2017	is	the	product	of	over	a	half-century	or	European	integration	(see	Appendix	1).	The	EU	came	into	existence	following	multiple	iterations	of	supranational	organizations,	each	organization	building	a	more	integrated	Europe.	Each	iteration	shared	a	similar	purpose,	vision,	and	goals	that	the	EU	of	today	emulates.	While	these	three	words	may	seem	synonymous,	there	are	significant	differences	between	these	three	measures	when	analyzed	closely.	The	purpose	of	the	EU	signifies	the	initial	reasons	for	its	creation.		In	contrast,	the	vision	of	the	EU	is	the	ultimate	dream	for	the	future	of	the	EU.	The	goals	of	the	EU	are	much	more	tangible,	individual	steps	that	the	EU	hopes	to	achieve	through	its	work.	Essentially,	the	goals	are	the	mechanisms	through	which	the	EU	hopes	to	fulfill	its	purpose	and	achieve	its	vision.	While	these	three	approaches	go	hand	in	hand,	there	is	some	question	as	to	whether	there	is	tension	between	the	purpose,	goals,	and	vision,	which	this	paper	will	investigate.		
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THE	PURPOSE,	VISION,	AND	GOALS	OF	THE	EUROPEAN	UNION	The	underlying	purpose	of	the	EU	is	relatively	simple:	peace	through	economic	integration.	Following	World	War	II,	the	European	Coal	and	Steel	community	was	founded	in	1951.	While	this	trade	agreement	is	far	from	the	scale	and	integration	of	the	EU	today,	this	agreement	was	the	initial	precursor	to	the	modern	common	market	that	is	the	EU.	Both	of	these	entities,	and	every	step	in	between	the	two	entities,	are	based	on	the	same	key	idea	that	“countries	that	trade	with	one	another	become	economically	interdependent	and	so	[they	are]	more	likely	to	avoid	conflict”25	While	the	ECSC	was	purely	economic	in	function	at	the	start,	it	expanded	into	a	political	union	in	1993	with	the	Treaty	of	Maastricht.		To	date,	it	seems	that	the	EU	has	worked	toward	economic	integration	with	significant	success,	achieving	its	goals	of	decreasing	tariffs	and	facilitating	the	free	movement	of	labor	within	the	EU.	This	economic	integration	can	be	largely	credited	for	over	sixty	years	of	peace	in	Europe,	as	the	founding	fathers	of	the	ECSC,	Robert	Schuman	and	Jean	Monnet,	had	hoped.			 In	addition	to	promoting	economic	integration	for	peace,	the	EU	also	views	its	purpose	as	promoting	human	rights,	democracy,	and	rule	of	law	within	Europe	and	around	the	world	as	established	in	the	2009	Treaty	of	Lisbon,	which	included	the	EU	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights.	Specifically,	the	EU	agreed	to	uphold	and	promote	the	human	rights	of	dignity,	freedoms,	equality,	solidarity,	citizens’	rights,	and	justice.26	This	EU	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	holds	not	just	symbolic	significance,	but	practical	significance	as	well.	The	question	of	human	rights	is	front	and	center	when	considering	Turkey’s	application	to																																																									25	“The	EU	in	Brief.”	Europa.eu.	https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-in-brief_en	(Oct.	16	2016).		26	Consolidated	Versions	of	the	Treaty	On	European	Union	and	of	the	Treaty	On	the	Functioning	of	the	European	
Union:	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	of	the	European	Union	(Luxemburg:	Office	for	Official	publications	of	the	European	Communities,	©2010),	1.		
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join	the	European	Union.	Joannes	Hahn,	an	Enlargement	Official	for	the	EU,	criticized	Turkey	for	its	recent	backsliding	in	human	rights,	rule	of	law,	and	democracy.	He	specifically	pointed	to	the	measures	taken	following	the	attempted	coup	d’état	in	July	2016,	allegations	of	torture,	exclusion	of	pro-Kurdish	political	parties,	and	the	efforts	of	the	Turkish	parliament	to	reinstate	the	death	penalty.	Hahn	argued	that	these	actions	and	others	“seem	to	be	incompatible	with	Turkey’s	official	desire	to	become	a	member	of	the	European	Union,”27	implying	that	the	EU	holds	its	belief	in	human	rights	as	a	core	tenant	for	EU	membership,	not	just	the	potential	for	economic	growth.	The	EU	developed	from	the	European	Community,	not	only	in	the	sense	of	the	prior	supranational	organization,	but	also	in	the	sense	that	it	stands	for	a	group	of	people	with	shared	values.			 The	close	connection	between	the	government	of	the	EU	and	the	non-governing	Council	of	Europe,	a	body	that	solely	focuses	on	promoting	European	values,	testifies	to	the	importance	of	human	rights,	democracy,	and	rule	of	law	in	the	Europe	and,	by	extension,	the	EU	itself.	28		The	Council	of	Europe	was	founded	in	1949	and	now	has	47	member	states	with	5	observer	states.	This	organization	has	created	over	200	legally	binding	treaties	since	its	creation,	all	of	which	advance	or	protect	the	key	values	of	the	Council.	No	state	has	ever	joined	the	EU	without	first	having	been	a	member	of	the	Council	of	Europe,	which	provides	
																																																								27	Gutman,	Roy	.	"EU	presses	Turkey	on	human	rights	and	other	issues;	President	Erdogan	demands	membership	decision."	LA	Times,	November	9,	2016.	Accessed	December	29,	2016.	http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-turkey-european-union-20161109-story.html.	28	The	Council	of	Europe	is	separate	from	the	EU.	It	is	not	to	be	confused	with	the	European	Council,	which	is	a	EU	institution,	composed	of	Heads	of	States	or	Heads	of	Governments.	The	European	Council	sets	the	overall	political	direction	for	the	EU.	The	Council	of	Europe	is	also	not	to	be	confused	with	the	Council	of	the	European	Union,	which	is	another	EU	institution.	The	Council	of	the	EU	is	one	of	the	legislative	bodies	of	the	EU	that	is	composed	of	government	ministers	from	each	member	state.	While	these	three	bodies	are	named	similarly,	they	are	all	distinct.		
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evidence	for	the	emphasis	the	EU	places	on	human	rights,	democracy,	and	rule	of	law.29	These	values	percolate	into	the	EU	itself,	such	that	the	purpose	of	the	EU	includes	promoting	these	three	values.		The	overarching	vision	many	perceive	for	the	EU	is	“to	fulfill	the	historical	ideal	of	European	unity.”30	Although	the	EU	was	formed	relatively	recently	in	history,	the	idea	of	European	integration,	or	even	European	unity,	began	thousands	of	years	ago	with	Rome.	The	Roman	Empire	united	the	majority	of	the	European	subcontinent,	and	now	serves	as	a	common	history	for	Europe.		This	shared	history	leads	to	fairly	similar	values	today,	and	the	idea	that	through	unity,	Europe	can	resurrect	the	glory,	power,	and	peace	that	Europe	enjoyed	during	the	Roman	Empire.	Charlemagne	first	attempted	to	resurrect	this	ancient	empire	and	unify	Europe	again	with	his	Holy	Roman	Empire,	and	while	this	venture	generally	failed,	his	vision	continues	to	survive.		Today,	the	feelings	of	unity	and	fraternity	still	thrive	throughout	Europe,	and	many	view	European	unity	as	the	ultimate	dream	for	Europe.31	While	peace	through	economic	integration,	protecting	human	rights,	and	fulfilling	historical	aspirations	may	be	the	high-level	purposes	and	vision	of	the	EU,	the	EU	has	more	tangible	goals	for	economic	development,	political	stability,	and	regional	security.	Jones	and	Verdun	argue	that	most	state	policy	makers	primarily	view	“the	EU	as	serving	to	improve	the	security	of	their	state,	[and]	to	aid	its	economic	growth.”32	The	EU	strengthens	
																																																								29	Lobey,	Sopie.	“History,	Role,	and	Activities	of	the	Council	of	Europe:	Facts,	Figures	and	Information	Sources.	»	Hauser	Global	Law	School	Program,	April	2005.	Accessed	December	29,	2016.	http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Council_of_Europe.html		30	Jones,	Erik,	and	Amy	Verdun,	eds.	The	Political	Economy	of	European	Integration:	Theory	and	Analysis.	London:	Routledge,	2005.	Accessed	October	19,	2016	31	"European	Unity:	The	History	of	an	Idea."	The	Economist,	December	30,	2003.	Accessed	October	25,	2016.	http://www.economist.com/node/2313040.  32.	Jones,	Erik,	and	Amy	Verdun.		
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the	defenses	of	Member	States	primarily	through	the	Common	Security	and	Defense	Policy	(CSDP)	and	the	European	Defense	Agency	(EDA).	The	CSDP	strengthens	“peace-keeping	operations,	conflict	prevention	and	in	the	strengthening	of	the	international	security,”33	while	the	EDA	facilitates	“defense	cooperation	among	its	Member	States	for	the	whole	life-cycle	of	a	capability	including	cooperation	in	research	and	technology	as	well	as	procurement	or	training.”34		To	promote	economic	growth	within	Europe,	the	EU	enables	most	people,	goods,	services,	and	capital	to	move	freely	within	the	EU	under	the	idea	that	reducing	internal	economic	barriers	will	facilitate	economic	growth.35	Building	on	the	idea	of	economic	advancement,	the	EU	adopted	the	Euro	as	a	common	currency	for	most	member-states	with	the	idea	that	“not	only	are	fluctuation	risks	and	exchange	costs	eliminated	and	the	single	market	strengthened,	but	the	euro	also	means	closer	co-operation	among	Member	States	for	a	stable	currency	and	economy	to	the	benefit	of	us	all.”36	There	are	some	examples	of	the	practical	goals	of	the	EU	to	for	economic	development,	political	stability,	and	regional	security.	
THE	FOUNDING	FATHERS:	JEAN	MONNET	AND	ROBERT	SCHUMAN	By	most	regards,	the	first	step	to	the	creation	of	the	European	Union	was	the	establishment	of	the	European	Coal	and	Steel	Community	(ECSC)	in	1951.	This	organization	was	the	thought	product	of	Jean	Monnet	and	Robert	Schuman,	who	are	
																																																								33	"The	Common	Security	and	Defense	Policy."	European	Union	External	Action.	Accessed	October	25,	2016.	https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/431/the-common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp_en.		34	EEAS.	"CSDP	structure,	instruments,	and	agencies."	European	Union	External	Action.	Last	modified	August	7,	2016.	Accessed	April	8,	2017.	https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5392/csdp-structure-instruments-and-agencies_en.	35	“The	EU	in	Brief.”	36	“Why	the	Euro?”	Europa.eu.	http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/why/index_en.htm	(Accessed	Oct.	16	2016).		
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generally	recognized	as	the	visionaries	responsible	for	ECSC	and	the	ultimate	creation	for	the	European	Union.	Schuman	and	Monnet	provide	significant	evidence	to	support	the	aforementioned	underlying	purpose,	vision,	and	goals	of	the	European	Union.	Monnet,	a	technocrat	at	heart,	drafted	the	Monnet	Plan,	laying	out	the	steps	for	the	formation	of	the	ECSC.	He	knew	that	he	could	not	sell	the	plan	to	the	European	people	solely	based	on	economic	integration	and	that	he	would	have	to	appeal	to	higher-level	European	values	for	the	plan	to	succeed.	Schuman,	the	more	charismatic	of	the	pair,	publically	announced	this	plan	with	his	famous	Schuman	Declaration	in	1950,	clearly	stating	the	reasons	why	such	a	unique	body	would	be	beneficial.		Jean	Monnet,	a	French	diplomat,	is	remembered	as	the	“architect	of	Europe”37	for	his	key	role	in	planning	the	integration	of	Europe.	In	addition	to	drafting	the	plans	for	the	ECSC,	he	attempted	to	create	the	European	Defense	Community	in	1954.	Although	this	was	rejected,	he	later	founded	the	Action	Committee	for	a	United	Europe	in	1955,	guided	by	his	belief	that	“prosperity	and	social	progress	depended	absolutely	upon	closer	economic	ties	between	European	States.”38	In	a	letter	to	the	founding	members,	Monnet	states	that	the	purpose	of	the	Action	Committee	for	a	United	Europe	was	to	“"to	achieve	a	United	States	of	Europe	by	concrete	accomplishments."39	To	achieve	this	vision,	he	argued,	“mere	cooperation	between	governments	will	not	suffice.	It	is	indispensable	for	States	to	delegate	certain	of	their	powers	to	European	federal	institutions	responsible	to	(mandataires	de)	all	
																																																								37	“High	Authority	of	the	European	Community	for	Coal	and	Steel.”	The	New	Monnet	Plan.	By	Leonard	Tennyson.	11th	ed.	1955.	Accessed	November	26,	2016.		38	"The	Monnet	Plan	-	From	the	Schuman	Plan	to	the	Paris	Treaty	(1950–1952)."	The	Monnet	Plan	-	From	the	Schuman	Plan	to	the	Paris	Treaty	(1950–1952)	-	CVCE	Website.	Accessed	November	26,	2016.	http://www.cvce.eu/en/recherche/unit-content/-/unit/5cc6b004-33b7-4e44-b6db-f5f9e6c01023/4802c240-1497-4127-9b14-f7b6896d6fd9.		39	“The	New	Monnet	Plan.”	Bulletin	from	the	European	Community	for	Coal	and	Steel.	No.	11,	December	
1955.	[EU	Other]	
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the	participating	countries	taken	as	a	whole.”40	Monnet	learned	from	the	failure	of	the	European	Defense	Community	that	the	key	to	European	political	and	economic	integration	lay	in	convincing	individual	governments	and	people	to	buy	into	the	idea	of	a	common	Europe	by	fostering	a	sense	of	European	identity.	He	wrote	in	the	Ney	York	Times	that	"if	the	governments	are	to	be	persuaded	to	make	the	choice	they	have	postponed	and	to	set	up	common	institutions	to	which	they	delegate	powers,	it	will	be	necessary	for	the	many	powerful	political	parties,	consumer	groups,	and	trade	unions	which	increasingly	favour	European	unity	to	organize	in	order	to	press	their	beliefs	and	to	explain	them	to	the	public	and	to	the	governments	themselves."41	In	other	words,	the	start	of	political	change	through	common	institutions	had	to	initiate	with	the	people	of	key	groups	by	their	choosing	to	act	as	European	citizens	in	unity	with	a	shared	identity,	and	then	pressuring	their	government	to	oblige.	Learning	from	the	prior	failure,	Monnet’s	different	methods	that	emphasized	a	shared	European	identity	to	promote	the	Action	Committee	for	a	United	Europe	was	a	success	and	this	new	venture	received	high	levels	of	public	support.42		Although	Monnet	was	the	architect	of	European	integration,	Schuman	was	its	public	face.	On	May	9th	of	1950,	French	Foreign	Minister	Robert	Schuman	issued	the	famous	Schuman	Declaration,	which	laid	the	groundwork	for	the	ECSC.	This	organization,	on	a	tangible	level,	was	meant	to	pool	industrial	production	of	coal	and	steel	for	member	nations	(namely	France	and	Germany)	under	one	common	authority,	which	would	hopefully	create	peace	from	economic	integration;	however,	the	organization	had	much	
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higher	ambitions	than	simply	fusing	coal	and	steel	production,	as	Schuman’s	proclamation	explained	his	ultimate	hopes	for	a	united	Europe.	Schuman	began	this	speech	by	recognizing	the	importance	of	peace	in	Europe.	He	made	a	bold	proposal	that	“an	organized	and	revitalized	Europe	can	make	a	contribution	to	civilization	which	is	indispensable	for	maintaining	such	peaceful	relations.”43	Such	statements	provide	strong	evidence	that	the	founders	of	the	ECSC,	the	first	step	to	the	establishment	of	the	EU,	strongly	equated	these	institutions	with	the	purpose	of	promoting	peace	in	Europe	following	nearly	a	half-century	of	war.	Moreover,	Schuman	explained	how	peace	could	be	achieved	through	integration	by	saying	that	“merging	of	our	interests	in	coal	and	steel	production	and	our	joint	action	will	make	it	plain	that	any	war	between	France	and	Germany	becomes	not	only	unthinkable	but	materially	impossible.”44	Simply	put,	fusing	economic	interests	minimizes	any	chance	of	war	occurring	between	member	nations,	thereby	promoting	peace	within	the	subcontinent;	however,	Schuman	did	not	limit	the	idea	of	peace	to	peace	within	Europe.	Recognizing	the	important	role	Europe	plays	on	the	world	stage	and	the	recent	evidence	for	European	wars	expanding	to	global	violence,	he	declared	that	the	ECSC	proposal	would	“bring	to	reality	the	first	solid	groundwork	for	a	European	Federation	vital	to	the	preservation	of	world	peace.”45		In	addition	to	focusing	on	peace	through	economic	unity,	Schuman	declared,	“Europe	will	be	born	from	this,	a	Europe	which	is	solidly	united	and	constructed	around	a	strong	framework,”	tying	into	the	ultimate	vision	he	had	for	the	ECSC	to	begin	the	path	
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toward	unity	in	Europe.	46	He	envisioned	that	the	ECSC	would	lead	way	to	a	“European	Federation”	with	greater	organization	and	unity,	and	stated,	“pooling	of	coal	and	steel	production	will	immediately	assure	the	establishment	of	common	bases	for	economic	development	as	a	first	step	for	the	European	Federation.”47		This	shows	that	he	viewed	the	ECSC	as	not	only	creating	peace	and	stability	within	Europe,	but	also	achieving	a	higher	vision	of	unity—the	sort	of	unity	that	can	only	be	achieved	through	a	shared	identity	as	Europeans	taking	priority.	Schuman	recognized	that	peace	in	Europe	and	the	ultimate	vision	of	European	unity	would	occur	through	the	realization	of	individual,	tangible	goals.	He	expressed	this	thought	by	saying,	“Europe	will	not	be	made	at	once,	nor	according	to	a	single	master	plan	of	construction.	It	will	be	built	by	concrete	achievements,	which	create	de	facto	dependence,	mutual	interests	and	the	desire	for	common	action.”48	With	this	understanding	of	the	necessity	of	tangible	steps	being	taken,	Schuman	then	declared	specific	goals	that	should	be	realized	for	the	success	of	the	ECSC.		First,	Schuman	proposed	“	to	place	Franco-German	production	of	coal	and	steel	under	one	common	High	Authority	in	an	organisation	open	to	the	participation	of	other	countries	of	Europe.”49	He	directly	correlated	these	goals	with	the	higher	ambitions	of	peace	and	unity	by	saying	“the	fusion	of	interests	which	is	vital	for	the	establishment	of	a	common	economic	system	will	be	realized.	Thus	the	leaven	will	be	introduced	which	will	permeate	and	build	a	wider	and	deeper	community	between	countries	that	had	continually	opposed	each	other	in	bloody	divisions.”50	Such	a	statement	
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clearly	shows	that	Schuman	recognized	that	individual,	tangible	goals	for	economic	integration	were	necessary	to	ultimately	achieve	the	higher	purpose	of	stability	and	vision	of	unity	behind	the	ECSC.		
TIMELINE	OF	EUROPEAN	INTEGRATION		The	European	Coal	and	Steel	Community	(ECSC)	was	officially	ratified	in	1952,	with	France,	West	Germany,	Italy,	Belgium,	The	Netherlands,	and	Luxembourg	as	the	original	members.	Its	purpose	was	to	integrate	the	coal	and	steel	industries	of	Europe	through	“the	establishment	of	a	common	market	for	coal	and	steel	for	those	countries	willing	to	delegate	control	of	these	sectors	of	their	economies	to	an	independent	authority.”51	While	this	specific	function	seems	to	be	primarily	economic,	its	economic	goals	simultaneously	served	political	aspirations	for	European	integration	as	previously	discussed.		At	an	economic	level,	the	ECSC	was	quite	successful	at	achieving	its	goals.	Steel	production	increased	fourfold,	such	that	it	was	now	of	better	quality,	cheaper,	and	produced	more	cleanly	due	to	integration	under	a	higher	authority.	While	coal	production	fell,	its	technological	development,	environmental	standards,	and	safety	standards	all	improved,	causing	the	ECSC	to	be	widely	viewed	as	an	economic	success.	Outside	of	economics,	it	appears	that	the	ECSC’s	economic	success	led	to	further	demand	for	integration,	which	led	to	the	Treaty	of	Rome.52		
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The	Treaty	of	Rome	was	established	in	1957,	which	created	the	European	Economic	Community		(EEC)	as	well	as	the	European	Atomic	Energy	Community	(EAEC).53	The	EEC,	EAEC,	and	ECSC	are	together	referred	to	as	the	European	Communities,	which	advanced	the	level	of	integration	dramatically	from	the	ECSC	alone.	The	EEC	advanced	the	initial	steps	of	the	ECSC	by	working	towards	a	common	market	between	the	member	states.	By	1968,	the	EEC	had	eliminated	tariffs	between	member	countries.		Additionally,	the	member	countries	agreed	to	establish	a	common	external	trade	policy	with	the	same	tariffs	for	non-member	countries	with	the	Treaty	of	Rome.	This	economic	union	was	a	major	step	towards	establishing	a	true	common	market	and	ultimately	signifies	a	shift	toward	political	unity	in	addition	to	the	prior	efforts	to	develop	economic	integration.	Finally,	the	Treaty	of	Rome	accounted	for	the	“free	movement	of	workers	and	freedom	of	establishment,	and	thus	individuals	as	employees	or	service	providers,”54	although	there	were	some	limitations	as	free	movement	was	restricted	solely	to	workers	whereas	the	Schengen	Agreement	expanded	free	movement	to	all	European	citizens.	Aside	from	advancing	economic	integration,	the	EEC	laid	the	foundation	for	the	political	underpinnings	of	European	integration.	Specifically,	it	created	the	European	Commission,	the	Council	of	Ministers,	the	European	Parliament,	as	well	as	the	European	Court	of	Justice.55	Initially	Belgium,	France,	The	Netherlands,	Luxembourg,	and	West	Germany	signed	the	Treaty	of	Rome,	although	the	EEC	expanded	to	include	a	total	of	12	members	by																																																									53	"The	Treaty	of	Rome	(1957)	-	The	History	of	the	European	Union	and	European	Citizenship."	The	History	of	the	European	Union	and	European	Citizenship.	Accessed	November	27,	2016.	http://www.historiasiglo20.org/europe/traroma.htm.  54		“Free	Movement	of	Persons.”	European	Parliament	At	Your	Service.	Accessed	November	27,	2016.	http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_2.1.3.html	55	"European	Community	(EC).”	Encyclopedia	Britannica	Online.	Accessed	November	27,	2016.		https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Community-European-economic-association		
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1990.	Through	all	of	these	measures,	the	EEC	sought	to	“lay	the	foundations	of	an	ever	closer	union	among	the	peoples	of	Europe.”56		The	period	following	the	creation	of	the	EEC	is	frequently	referred	to	as	a	period	of	“eurosclerosis,”	or	stagnation	in	the	process	of	European	integration.	One	explanation	for	this	is	that	the	EEC	increased	from	six	members	to	nine	members,	which	increased	the	complexity	and	ultimately	led	to	resistance.	Additionally,	this	increase	in	membership	occurred	during	an	economic	slowdown,	which	perhaps	cast	doubt	on	the	economic	advancement	promised	from	integration,	as	recessions	historically	tend	to	increase	economic	protectionism	and	the	rise	of	nationalist	sentiments.57		This	period	was	especially	marked	by	tension	between	France	and	the	EEC.	One	key	cause	of	tension	was	the	renegotiation	of	agricultural	regulations.	The	revision	of	the	Common	Agricultural	Policy	(CAP)	was	due	to	occur	in	1965.		Under	the	revision,	the	financing	was	to	come	from	the	Community	directly,	and	no	longer	from	individual	member	nations.	This	appeared	as	an	increase	in	supranationalism,	that	wasn’t	entirely	welcome	to	France.	Even	more	so,	the	proposals	were	to	provide	“for	an	extension	of	the	powers	and	responsibilities	of	the	Parliamentary	Assembly	and	particularly	of	the	Commission,	which	emphasised	the	supranational	character	of	the	EEC.”58	In	spite	of	public	opposition	from	French	General	de	Gaulle,	the	proposal	was	submitted	to	the	European	Parliament	without	directly	consulting	member	nations.	This	tension	from	increased	integration	was	expounded	given	that	the	evolution	to	the	third	state	of	transition	to	a	
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common	market	was	set	to	start	in	1966.	France	viewed	these	combined	events	as	threats	to	its	national	sovereignty.59		Due	to	its	opposition,	France	refused	to	take	its	seat	at	the	Council	of	Ministers	until	its	demands	were	met,	a	boycott	that	is	now	referred	to	as	the	“empty	chair	crisis.”	This	act	was	significant,	as	it	was	the	first	time	since	the	Treaty	of	Rome	was	enacted	in	1958	that	the	EEC	could	not	operate	due	to	the	actions	of	a	member	state.	This	crisis	lasted	for	six	months,	but	was	ultimately	resolved	by	the	Luxembourg	Compromise.	This	compromise	encourages	cooperation	and	“stipulates	that	if	a	Member	State	believes	that	its	vital	interests	are	at	stake,	negotiations	have	to	continue	until	a	universally	acceptable	compromise	is	reached.”	While	this	compromise	was	successful	in	resolving	this	crisis,	it	was	ultimately	changed	in	1987	with	the	Single	European	Act	that	expanded	the	range	of	decisions	that	could	be	made	simply	by	a	qualified	majority.60	While	moving	to	a	qualified	majority	can	improve	efficiency,	the	switch	away	from	requiring	consensus	can	be	viewed	by	member	states	as	undermining	national	sovereignty,	as	a	member	state	can	then	be	mandated	to	follow	a	decision	of	the	body	that	passed	by	qualified	majority	even	if	the	state	itself	opposed	the	decision.		In	spite	of	these	setbacks,	a	number	of	incremental	steps	toward	integration	occurred	in	the	1970s	and	1980s.	Firstly,	the	European	Parliament	developed	new	competencies	including	“the	incremental	development	of	its	budgetary	powers	in	1970/75	and	direct	elections	in	1979.”		Additionally,	political	interest	groups	aiming	to	influence	national	governments	developed	increased	attention	for	the	EEEC.	Foreign	policy																																																									59	“Causes	of	the	Crisis.”		60	“The	Luxembourg	Compromise	(January	1966).”		CVCE.eu.	Accessed	December	2,	2016.	http://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/d1cfaf4d-8b5c-4334-ac1d-0438f4a0d617/a9aaa0cd-4401-45ba-867f-50e4e04cf272		
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cooperation	also	advanced	through	the	European	Political	Cooperation	(EPC),	which	facilitated	foreign	policy	coordination.	The	European	Commission	also	grew	in	significance	as	it	developed	increased	policy-making	abilities	and	launched	the	European	Monetary	System	(EMS)	in	1979.	Finally,	the	European	Court	of	Justice	also	made	multiple	significant	rulings	that	facilitated	political	integration.	Through	these	measures,	we	can	see	that	in	spite	of	increased	economic	protectionism	and	the	rise	of	Euroscepticism	from	the	1960s	to	the	1980s,	there	was	some	progress	toward	further	integration.61	European	integration	rebounded	with	the	Treaty	of	Maastricht,	which	was	signed	in	1992.	This	treaty	created	the	European	Union	with	three	pillars:	the	European	Communities	(reformed	version	of	the	EEC,	ECSC,	and	EAEC),	Common	Security	and	Foreign	Policy	(CSFP),	and	Justice	and	Home	Affairs	(JHA)	that	facilitated	police	and	judicial	cooperation.	This	treaty	went	beyond	the	primarily	economic	measures	of	former	treaties	like	the	EEC	and	moved	toward	increased	political	integration.	This	treaty	also	clarified	and	expanded	the	roles	of	the	European	Parliament,	European	Commission,	and	the	Council	of	Ministers.	Additionally,	it	further	expanded	the	idea	of	a	European	community	by	creating	policies	related	to	trans-European	networks,	industrial	policy,	culture,	and	introducing	the	concept	of	European	citizenship.	Through	European	citizenship,	citizens	of	member	nations	became	simultaneous	European	citizens,	which	expanded	their	rights	to	travel	and	live	anywhere	within	the	EU.	Finally,	this	treaty	planned	for	a	monetary	union,	facilitating	the	ultimate	goal	of	a	single	market.	Ultimately,	this	treaty	called	for	the	creation	of	a	common	currency	by	1999	as	well	as	the	Central	European	Bank	(CEB)	and	European	System	of	
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Central	Banks	(ECSB).	62	While	these	bodies	and	the	treaty	as	a	whole	was	eventually	revised	under	the	Treaty	of	Nice,	its	ultimate	foundations	were	not	significantly	changed	until	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon.		The	Treaty	of	Maastricht	almost	failed	to	be	ratified	as	the	people	of	Denmark	rejected	it	in	1992	in	a	public	referendum.	While	this	rejection	was	perceived	as	threatening	the	entire	experiment	of	European	integration,	today	many	view	it	as	the	“result	of	a	preference	for	an	intergovernmental	type	of	European	Co-operation.”63	Additionally,	the	Danish	are	recognized	for	having	a	particularly	strong	national	identity,	largely	due	to	the	country’s	homogeneous	society	with	nation	and	state	almost	perfectly	coinciding,	which	can	pose	challenges	for	European	integration.64	Because	approval	from	all	member	nations	was	required	for	the	Treaty,	the	Edinburg	Agreement	gave	Denmark	four	exceptions	to	the	Treaty	of	Maastricht.	The	most	exception	was	that	Denmark	claimed	the	right	to	opt-out	of	monetary	integration,	such	that	it	would	not	be	required	to	use	the	Euro.	The	United	Kingdom	also	has	similar	reservations,	and	both	countries	secured	the	right	to	opt-out	of	a	monetary	union.65			 In	spite	of	the	Danish	and	UK	opt-outs,	the	Euro	was	established	in	1999	as	planned	in	the	Treaty	of	Maastricht,	although	it	wasn’t	until	2002	that	Euro	notes	were	introduced.		The	adoption	of	a	single	currency	was	proposed	under	the	rationale	that	it	would	facilitate	the	adoption	of	common	monetary	policy	and	would	“ensure	this	currency's	stability																																																									62	“Treaty	of	Maastricht	on	European	Union.”		EUR-Lex	Access	to	European	Law.	Accessed	November	27,	2016.		http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Axy0026		63	Worre,	T.	(1995),	First	No,	Then	Yes:	The	Danish	Referendums	on	the	Maastricht	Treaty	1992	and	1993.	JCMS:	Journal	of	Common	Market	Studies,	33:	235–257.	doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.1995.tb00529.x	64	Gotsi,	Daniella,	Ali	Haider,	Joanna	Ivars,	and	Marloes	Van	Den	Berg.	Nationalism	in	Denmark	and	the	Euro.	Roskilde	University.	Edited	by	Linni	Rita	Gad.	2006.	Accessed	December	2,	2016.		65	“Opting	Out.”	EUR-Lex:	Access	to	European	Union	Law.	Accessed	December	2,	2016.	http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/opting_out.html		
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thanks	to	price	stability	and	respect	for	the	market	economy.”66	Today,	19	of	the	27	EU	members	have	adopted	the	Euro	with	only	Denmark	and	the	United	Kingdom	opting	out	of	the	Euro	while	the	remaining	nations	have	yet	to	qualify	for	the	Euro.67	Many	of	the	nations	that	have	yet	to	qualify	appear	to	be	making	minimal	efforts	to	do	so,	and	the	EU	similarly	appears	to	refrain	from	exerting	pressure	for	them	to	do	so.		In	2004,	the	Treaty	establishing	a	Constitution	for	Europe	was	signed,	pending	ultimate	approval	from	all	of	the	member	states.	This	Constitution	ultimately	failed	due	to	rejections	from	France	and	The	Netherlands	in	referendums	in	2005.	Although	it	failed,	the	Constitution	is	still	noteworthy,	primarily	to	gain	an	understanding	of	the	very	reasons	it	failed.	The	European	Constitution	served	to	repeal	the	previous	treaties	and	then	replace	them	with	minor	revisions	in	a	single	document.	To	many,	the	complete	repealing	of	previous	Treaties	perhaps	seemed	extreme,	even	if	the	ultimate	product	was	substantively	similar	in	many	ways.	Additionally,	studies	suggest	that	the	rejection	of	the	Constitution	by	both	the	French	and	Dutch	public	in	national	referendums68	was	largely	a	result	of	Euro-skepticism,	or	a	“fundamentally	question[ing]	the	specific	form	of	the	EU.”	In	essence,	the	reservations	of	the	French	and	the	Dutch	related	to	skepticism	about	adopting	a	European	identity	over	a	national	identity,	similar	to	the	initial	rejection	of	the	Treaty	of	Maastricht	by	Denmark.	Such	skepticism	played	a	largely	role	in	the	European	Constitution,	rather	than	previous	or	future	treaties,	presumably	because	the	simple	use	of	the	word	
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“Constitution”	(used	180	times	in	the	document)69	evokes	thoughts	of	a	single,	unified	government	and	appears	more	threatening	to	state	sovereignty.		The	Treaty	of	Lisbon,	which	was	substantively	rather	similar	to	the	failed	European	Constitution,	was	created	in	2007	and	ultimately	adopted	in	2009.		This	treaty	primarily	reformed	the	structure	of	the	European	Union	because	the	EU	had	grown	significantly	since	the	Treaty	of	Maastricht	and	the	Treaty	of	Nice,	which	necessitated	reforms	for	the	EU.	As	aforementioned,	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon	shared	many	similarities	with	the	European	Constitution,	as	“the	majority	of	the	institutional	and	policy	reforms	envisaged	in	the	Constitution	are	included	in	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon,	but	presented	in	a	different	form.”70	Rather	than	replacing	all	previous	treaties,	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon	simply	revised	them.		By	simply	revising	previous	treaties	and	avoiding	the	associations	brought	up	with	the	word	“Constitution,”	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon	make	efficient	revisions	to	the	structure	of	the	European	Union	without	bringing	up	the	prior	resistance	associated	with	an	increased	perception	of	a	the	EU	infringing	on	state	sovereignty	or	national	identity.	Essentially,	it	sacrificed	the	advancement	of	a	European	identity	in	favor	of	practical	revisions	that	facilitated	European	integration,	such	that	national	identity	and	state	sovereignty	still	felt	respected.	Perhaps	European	integration	needed	to	be	improved	to	function	better,	before	people	would	be	willing	to	give	a	European	identity	a	chance.	Although,	some	argue	that	even	this	would	not	help	as	national	sovereignty	is	so	ingrained	that	it	could	not	be	abandoned	so	quickly.		
																																																								69	“Constitution.”	EU-ABC.com.	Accessed	November	27,	2016.		http://en.euabc.com/word/298		70	“The	Treaty	of	Lisbon:	Introduction.”		EUR-Lex	Access	to	European	Law.	Accessed	November	27,	2016.		http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3Aai0033		
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Some	of	the	structural	changes	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon	made	included	revising	the	rules	of	composition	for	the	key	bodies	of	the	EU,	and	the	decision-making	process	of	the	European	Council	changed	to	qualified	majority	voting71.	Additionally,	the	position	of	the	President	of	the	European	Council	was	created.	Perhaps	most	importantly,	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon	abolished	the	old	three-pillar	structure	and	introduced	a	distribution	of	competencies	between	the	EU	and	member	states.	Additionally,	the	powers	of	the	European	Parliament	increased	through	this	treaty	with	the	ultimate	goal	of	advancing	democracy	within	the	EU.	The	Treaty	of	Lisbon	also	revised	the	internal	and	external	policies	of	the	EU.	Internally,	the	powers	of	the	EU	relating	to	border	control,	immigration,	judicial	cooperation,	and	police	cooperation	increased.	Externally,	the	power	of	the	Common	foreign	and	Security	Policy	became	more	coherent,	the	High	Representative	or	Foreign	Affairs	and	Security	Policy	gained	the	ability	to	represent	the	EU	globally,	and	sections	of	the	founding	treaties	are	now	devoted	to	the	Common	Security	and	Defense	Policy	with	the	long	term	goal	of	establishing	the	Common	European	Defense.	72	This	was	the	latest	major	step	in	European	integration,	creating	the	EU	as	it	functions	today.		Throughout	the	development	of	the	EU,	tensions	have	occurred	between	the	higher-level	purpose	and	vision	of	the	EU	with	its	more	concrete	goals.	Economic	integration,	save	some	difficulty	with	monetary	integration	under	the	EU,	appears	quite	feasible	in	Europe,	as	it	has	already	been	accomplished	to	a	great	extent.	Although	the	desire	for	economic	integration	is	largely	shared,	there	can	be	a	conflict	between	those	who	purely	value	economic	integration	for	the	economic	growth	it	promotes	and	those	who	view	economic	
																																																								71	The	change	to	qualified	majority	voting	could	be	seen	as	a	threat	to	state	sovereignty,	as	a	state	could	be	required	to	follow	legislation	it	opposed	if	the	state	was	in	the	minority	opposition.		72	“The	Treaty	of	Lisbon:	Introduction”		
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integration	as	the	means	to	peace	and	European	unity.		Additionally,	difficulties	and	tensions	can	arise	from	attempts	to	push	for	political	integration,	because	that	can	challenge	preconceived	notions	of	identity.	Consequently,	goals	purely	for	integration	that	alluded	to	a	single	Europe,	such	as	the	Constitution	of	Europe,	received	pushback	to	a	greater	extent	than	goals	for	primarily	economic	integration.	This	evidence	suggests	that	the	vision	of	a	unified	Europe	through	economic	integration	is	more	likely	to	be	opposed	when	specific	measures	appear	to	infringe	upon	national	identities	or	national	sovereignty.	Any	perceived	threat	on	national	identities	or	sovereignty	could	spark	Eurosceptic	sentiments	and	threaten	further	integration.		
THE	EUROPEAN	UNION	IN	2017	The	EU	of	2017	functions	as	a	single	market	with	no	internal	tariffs	or	quotas,	common	external	tariffs	and	quotas,	mobility	of	capital	and	people,	a	mostly	common	currency,	as	well	as	shared	foreign,	fiscal,	and	monetary	policy.73	As	a	single	market,	the	European	Union	is	a	powerful	entity	within	Europe	as	well	as	globally.	Made	up	of	28	member	states	(see	Appendix	2),	the	EU	plays	a	powerful	role	on	the	world	stage	as	the	EU	GDP	tops	€13,920,	541	million	as	of	2014.	Although	the	EU	accounts	for	less	than	10%	of	the	global	population,	it	accounts	for	approximately	20%	of	global	trade.	This	economic	significance	gives	way	to	global	political	power	that	smaller	European	nations	wouldn’t	possess	alone.74		
																																																								73	Gerber,	Linda.	“Economic	Integration	Lecture.”	Accessed	December	29,	2016.		74	“The	Economy.”	Europa.	Accessed	December	29,	2016.	https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/figures/economy_en		
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THE	KEY	INSTUTIONS	OF	THE	EUROPEAN	UNION	There	is	no	single	institution,	nor	a	single	President	or	Prime	Minister,	in	charge	of	the	EU.	Rather,	the	EU	operates	through	seven	key	institutions	(see	Appendix	3	and	Appendix	4),	two	advisory	bodies,	and	multiple	agencies.	As	the	institutions	have	the	greatest	significance	and	power,	it	is	necessary	to	understand	their	roles	and	power	as	that	most	directly	relates	to	political	tensions	between	the	EU	and	member	states.75		The	first	institution	of	the	EU	is	the	European	Council,	which	is	a	largely	strategic	body	that	decides	the	political	direction	of	the	EU.	The	European	Council	“gives	to	the	Union	the	necessary	impulses	for	its	development	and	it	defines	the	general	political	orientations."76	This	institution	is	key	in	establishing	the	political	purview	and	direction	of	the	EU.	The	European	Council	is	composed	of	the	Heads	of	State	of	Heads	of	Government	of	all	member	states,	as	well	as	the	President	of	the	European	Council,	the	President	of	the	European	Commission,	and	the	Head	of	the	Common	Foreign	and	Security	Policy	(CFSP)	as	the	European	Council	represents	the	EU	abroad	for	relevant	aspects	of	the	CFSP.		The	European	Commission	is	the	executive	arm	of	the	EU.	It	is	largely	an	administrative	body	that	addresses	practical	issues	of	EU	governance	and	is	responsible	for	proposing	legislation	and	the	budget	to	the	legislative	bodies	of	the	European	Parliament	and	the	Council	of	the	European	Union.	The	Commission	solicits	input	from	member	states	and	EU	citizens	by	conducting	“preliminary	interviews	with	the	governments	of	the	member	states,	the	representatives	of	industry	and	unions,	and	other	experts,	to	take	into	
																																																								75	“Detailed	Explanations	about	the	Institutions	of	the	European	Union.”	Strasbourg,	2007.	Accessed	December	29,	2016.	http://en.strasbourg-europe.eu/detailed-explanations-about-the-institutions-of-the-european-union,3214,en.html	76	“Treaty	on	the	European	Union.”	Europa.	Accessed	December	29,	2016.	https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf	
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account	their	interests	in	its	initiatives”	before	legislative	texts	are	submitted	to	the	Council	of	the	European	Union	and	the	Parliament.	In	addition	to	research	and	relations	with	member	states,	the	Commission	also	enforces	the	implementation	of	legislation,	treaties,	and	the	budget.	Finally,	the	Commission	works	to	represent	the	EU	globally	under	the	instruction	of	the	Council.	The	Commission	is	made	up	of	one	Commissioner	from	each	member	state,	with	each	Commissioner	in	charge	of	a	specific	domain.	Although	each	Commissioner	is	in	charge	of	a	specific	area,	the	Commission	as	a	whole	must	decide	unanimously	on	every	file.		Furthermore,	the	Commissioners	are	not	to	represent	the	specific	interests	of	their	state,	rather	they	are	to	represent	the	general	interests	of	the	EU.	Therefore,	the	Commissioners	are	voted	on	by	the	European	Parliament,	rather	than	appointed	by	member	states.	The	Commission	also	has	a	President	who	is	appointed	and	serves	a	five-year	term.	While	these	are	the	official	positions,	the	Commission	also	consists	of	thousands	of	administrators	and	researchers.77		The	European	Parliament	is	the	first	of	the	legislative	bodies	of	the	EU,	serving	as	the	voice	of	the	European	citizens	for	the	EU.	This	body	is	comprised	of	751	Members	of	European	Parliament	(MEP)	who	are	directly	elected	by	the	people	of	member	states	under	a	system	of	proportional	representation.	The	number	of	MEPs	each	member	state	gets	is	based	on	its	relative	population.	Within	the	Parliament,	the	MEPs	group	together	not	by	nation,	but	by	political	party.	The	parties	themselves	are	also	very	important	in	the	European	Union,	as	the	parties	play	a	large	role	in	the	legislative	process.	The	two	largest	parties	are	the	European	People’s	Party,	a	centre-right	party	and	the	Progressive	Alliance	of	Socialists	&	Democrats,	a	centre-left	party.	There	are	six	other	parties	(and	some	non-																																																								77	“Detailed	Explanations.”	
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attached	Members	of	Parliament	that	are	independent	from	these	parties)	that	represent	other	areas	of	the	political	spectrum.78	The	Parliament	also	has	a	President,	who	is	appointed	and	serves	a	two	and	a	half	year	term.	The	Parliament	serves	multiple	functions,	but	most	notably	participates	in	legislative	functions	in	collaboration	with	the	Commission	and	the	Council.	The	Parliament	must	be	consulted	on	every	piece	of	legislation.	Additionally,	Parliament	serves	budgetary	power	with	the	Council	and	has	the	specific	power	to	modify	non-mandatory	expenditures,	and	approve	the	final	budget	of	the	Community.79	The	second	legislative	institution	of	the	EU	is	the	Council	of	the	European	Union,	also	known	as	the	Council	of	Ministers	or	simply	“the	Council.”	This	institution	is	the	voice	of	the	governments	of	the	member	states.	The	Council	is	composed	of	government	ministers	from	each	member	state	and	these	ministers	have	the	power	to	commit	their	governments	to	the	actions	the	Council	agrees	upon.	The	Council	has	a	President,	which	rotates	among	member	nations	with	six	month	long	terms	for	each	President.		80	The	Council	works	with	the	European	Parliament	(the	two	have	equal	power)	on	the	budget	of	the	EU	and	passing	legislation	proposed	by	the	Commission.	Previously	all	votes	of	the	Council	had	to	be	unanimous,	but	the	Lisbon	Treaty	revised	this	requirement	such	that	votes	no	longer	need	to	be	unanimous,	but	passed	legislation	from	a	qualified	majority	can	be	vetoed	by	national	parliaments.	Some	sensitive	topics,	such	as	foreign	policy	and	taxation,	still	require	unanimous	votes.81																																																										78	"Political	Groups."	It's	Your	Parliament.	Accessed	April	29,	2017.	http://www.itsyourparliament.eu/groups/.	79	“Detailed	Explanations.”	80	“Detailed	Explanations.”		81	"Council	of	the	European	Union."	EUROPA.	March	09,	2017.	Accessed	April	08,	2017.	https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/council-eu_en.	
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The	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	is	the	primarily	legal	institution	of	the	EU.	Its	legal	domain	is	focused	on	matters	related	to	EU	legislation,	as	the	Court	is	“in	charge	of	verifying	the	interpretation	and	the	application	of	community	legislation.”82		The	Court	is	comprised	of	28	judges,	one	per	member	state.	Each	judge,	in	addition	to	being	recognized	as	a	legal	expert,	must	also	have	his	or	her	“independence	is	beyond	doubt.”83	This	qualification	is	significant	as	it	signifies	that	the	judges	must	not	represent	their	national	interests.	Instead,	the	judges	must	consider	legal	matters	based	on	EU	law	and	the	EU.		In	addition	to	the	28	judges,	the	Court	consists	of	nine	Advocates-General,	who	publically	convey	the	conclusions	of	the	Court.	These	Advocates-General	must	meet	the	same	criteria	of	legal	expertise	and	mental	independence	as	the	judges	and	are	appointed	with	the	agreement	of	all	member	state	governments.	The	Court	can	hear	cases	petitioned	by	member	states,	European	citizens,	EU	institutions,	or	other	European	entities.	The	rulings	of	the	court	require	a	majority	of	its	judges,	and	are	legally	binding	in	all	member	states.		The	European	Central	Bank	(ECB)	is	an	official	EU	organization	for	the	member	states	that	have	adopted	Euro--	the	common	currency	of	the	EU.	The	ECB	works	with	national	central	banks	(the	combination	of	which	is	often	referred	to	as	the	Eurosystem)	to	ensure	price	stability	and	the	stability	of	the	value	of	the	Euro	by	“defining	and	implementing	monetary	policy,	conducting	foreign	exchange	operations,	holding	and	managing	the	euro	area’s	foreign	currency	reserves”	and	other	measures.	The	ECB	specifically	exercises	powers	of	“banking	supervision,	banknotes,	statistics,	macroprudential	policy	and	financial	stability	as	well	as	international	and	European																																																									82	“Detailed	Explanations.”	83	“Detailed	Explanations.”	
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cooperation”	as	well	as	setting	interest	rates.84	The	ECB	is	run	by	its	Governing	Council,	which	consists	of	the	six	members	of	the	Executive	Board	as	well	the	governors	of	the	central	banks	of	euro-using	member	states	who	are	appointed	by	their	home	governments.		The	European	Council	appoints	all	members	of	the	ECB	Governing	Council,	including	the	President	of	the	ECB,	with	a	majority	of	votes.	As	of	2015	when	Lithuania	joined	the	euro	area,	the	ECB	voting	procedures	changed	to	a	system	utilizing	rotational	voting.	As	such,	the	governors	representing	the	five	largest	economies	will	rotate	a	total	of	four	voting	rights,	and	the	remaining	governors	from	smaller	economies	will	rotate	eleven	voting	rights.	Rotations	for	both	groups	occur	on	a	monthly	basis.	Finally,	the	six	Executive	Board	members	each	have	voting	rights.85	Additionally,	the	ECB	has	a	Supervisory	Board	composed	of	an	appointed	Chair,	a	Vice-Chair	chosen	from	the	Executive	Board	members,	four	ECB	representatives,	and	representatives	from	national	supervisors.		Finally,	the	Court	of	Auditors,	while	one	of	the	lesser-known	institutions,	is	quite	significant	as	it	is	responsible	for	controlling	the	budget	and	ensuring	that	all	budgetary	manners	are	handled	“in	a	lawful	and	regular	manner.”86	The	Court	of	Auditors	is	made	up	of	one	Auditor	per	member	state	who	is	appointed	for	a	six-year	term	by	Council	of	the	Union	in	consultation	with	Parliament.		The	Court	of	Auditors	also	consists	of	agents	who	manage	the	use	and	collection	of	EU	funds	with	relations	to	EU	institutions,	member	states,	and	any	other	organizations	with	EU	funding.		
																																																								84	“Tasks.”	European	Central	Bank.	Europa.	Accessed	December	29,	2016.	http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/tasks/html/index.en.html		85	“Rotation	of	Voting	Rights	in	the	Governing	Council.”	European	Central	Bank.	Europa.	Accessed	December	29,	2016.	http://www.ecb.europa.eu/explainers/tell-me-more/html/voting-rotation.en.html		86	“Detailed	Explanations.”	
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The	institutions	of	the	European	Union,	while	limited	by	checks	and	balances,	still	hold	vast	amounts	of	power	over	many	areas.	It	is	only	natural	that	there	would	then	be	some	conflict	between	the	power	of	the	supranational	organization	and	the	individual	power	of	its	member	states.	There	is	controversy	about	the	level	of	power	and	supervision	that	European	citizens	and	member	states	have	to	supervise	the	EU.	The	Parliament	is	the	only	EU	institution	that	directly	answers	to	European	citizens,	causing	many	to	think	that	the	EU	has	a	democratic	deficit.	Granted,	the	Council	can	be	seen	as	indirectly	represents	the	interests	of	European	citizens	as	it	consists	of	elected	leaders	of	each	member	state.	Nonetheless,	the	rest	of	the	institutions	answer	only	to	the	Parliament	or	the	Council,	which	limits	the	ability	of	citizens	to	supervise	EU	governance	and	potentially	limits	the	ability	of	member	states	to	supervise	EU	governance	as	well.		This	limited	supervision	abilities	of	European	citizens	and	member	states	fuels	the	concerns	of	EU	citizens	and	member	states	that	national	interests	may	not	be	valued	at	a	supranational	level,	leading	to	a	potential	conflict	of	interests	between	the	EU	and	member	states.	This	limited	supervision	and	democratic	deficit	likely	contributes	to	anti-EU	sentiments	for	those	who	favor	a	national	identity	over	a	European	identity,	which	can	influence	national	governments.	In	order	to	better	understand	the	public	perception	on	the	European	Union	and	the	impact	of	this	perception	on	the	legitimacy	of	the	EU,	it	is	necessary	to	analyze	data	from	the	Eurobarometer	survey,	addresses	these	very	topics.	
EUROBAROMETER:	PUBLIC	OPINION	ON	THE	EUROPEAN	UNION	Biannually	the	European	Commission	conducts	public	opinion	surveys	related	to	the	European	Union.	The	most	significant	of	these	surveys	is	the	Standard	Eurobarometer,	which	largely	focuses	on	public	opinion	of	the	European	Union.	In	recent	years,	the	
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Eurobarometer	survey	studied	the	opinions	of	citizens	of	the	28	member	countries,	five	candidate	countries,	and	the	Turkish	Cypriot	community	not	controlled	by	Cyprus.	This	survey	has	been	conducted	for	all	EU	member	states	since	1973,	providing	ample	evidence	for	how	public	opinion	of	the	European	Union	has	shifted	over	time.	As	this	paper	primarily	focuses	on	the	recent	history	of	the	European	Union,	this	paper	will	primarily	address	the	most	recent	decade	of	Eurobarometer	data	results	based	on	Eurobarometer	85	from	the	spring	of	2016.	This	study	will	especially	focus	on	any	trends	or	sudden	shifts	in	public	perspective,	especially	the	notable	shift	towards	a	more	negative	tone	between	the	2015	and	2016	surveys.	87	On	some	level,	the	2016	data	shows	that	Europeans	had	a	fairly	positive	view	of	the	European	Union,	as	50%	of	EU	28	citizens	were	optimistic	about	the	future	of	the	EU	and	51%	of	respondents	wanted	more	decisions	to	be	made	at	a	EU	level.	Only	38%	wanted	fewer	decisions	to	be	made	at	a	EU	level.	The	majority	of	respondents	agree	that	the	EU	was	“democratic,”	“modern,”	“forward-thinking,”	and	“protective.”	75%	of	respondents	felt	that	the	terms	“solidarity”	and	“security”	brought	to	mind	a	positive	feelings	associated	with	the	EU.	On	a	practical	note,	66%	of	respondents	feel	that	the	EU	made	it	easier	to	do	business	in	Europe.88		From	the	data,	it	seems	that	Europeans	generally	focused	on	the	practical	goals	of	the	EU,	rather	than	its	loftier	visions	and	purpose.	Within	the	EU	member	states,	50%	of	respondents	said	that	the	EU	personally	meant	the	“freedom	to	travel,	study,	and	work	anywhere	in	the	EU.”	35%	of	respondents	identified	the	Euro	as	their	personal	meaning	for	
																																																								87	European	Commission.	Standard	Eurobarometer	85-	Spring	2015-	Public	opinion	in	the	European	Union.	May	2016.	Accessed	January	27,	2017.		88	Standard	Eurobarometer	85.	
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the	EU,	and	28%	selected	“cultural	diversity”	as	their	meaning	of	the	EU.	The	fourth	most	popular	response	for	the	meaning	of	the	EU	was	“peace”	(in	line	with	the	initial	intents	of	the	founders)	at	only	27%,	which	suggests	that	any	argument	basing	the	existence	of	the	EU	on	creating	peace	comes	second	to	tangible	benefits	the	EU	can	deliver	in	the	eyes	of	the	people.	Only	15%	of	respondents	viewed	a	“loss	of	cultural	identity”	as	a	personal	meaning	of	the	EU,	suggesting	that	the	conflict	between	a	specific	cultural	identity	and	the	greater	European	identity	may	not	be	top	of	mind	for	many	EU	citizens;	however,	Europeans	still	seem	to	associate	with	national	identity	more	than	a	European	identity.89	Primary	identification	with	the	state	before	identification	with	Europe	can	still	pose	an	obstacle	to	European	integration,	even	if	the	two	are	in	direct	conflict,	as	integration	can	come	second	to	national	interests.			The	Spring	2015	Eurobarometer	survey	also	asked	questions	on	support	for	key	EU	policies,	most	of	which	received	overwhelming	support.	The	Common	Security	and	Defense	Policy	had	74%	approval,	the	Common	Migration	Policy	had	73%	approval,	and	the	Common	Energy	Policy	had	72%	approval.	The	approval	for	a	common	foreign	policy	was	slightly	lower	at	66%,	but	still	maintained	a	firm	majority.	57%	of	respondents	favored	the	use	of	monetary	union	with	the	single	currency	of	the	Euro.	Although,	7	countries	had	less	than	half	the	popular	desire	a	single	currency--	Cyprus,	Bulgaria,	Poland,	Denmark,	Sweden,	Czech	Republic,	and	the	United	Kingdom.		56%	of	respondents	favored	an	agreement	for	free	trade	and	investment	between	the	EU	and	the	USA.	The	only	policy	
																																																								89	Standard	Eurobarometer	85	and	EU	interviews	
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proposal	that	received	less	than	majority	support	was	for	future	EU	enlargement,	which	had	only	39%	support.90		Perhaps	part	of	the	reason	for	supporting	the	EU	is	that	many	European	citizens	felt	that	EU	membership	is	necessary	given	that	55%	of	EU	member	state	citizens	disagree	with	the	claim	that	their	country	could	better	face	the	future	outside	the	EU.	It	seems	that	part	of	the	reason	for	this	sentiment	is	that	68%	of	respondents	felt	that	the	EU’s	voice	counts	in	the	world.	Considering	these	two	points	together,	it	seems	that	many	think	that	participating	the	EU,	which	as	a	single	entity	has	much	larger	political	and	economic	power	than	the	sum	of	its	parts,	makes	otherwise	small	and	less	significant	European	countries	feel	that	they	have	a	greater	say	in	the	world	they	would	alone.91	Yet,	not	all	of	the	data	reflected	positively	on	the	EU.		Up	to	48%	of	respondents	were	not	satisfied	with	how	democracy	works	in	the	EU—the	highest	level	of	dissatisfaction	since	2004.	Only	42%	of	respondents	were	satisfied	with	how	democracy	works	in	the	EU,	which	is	rather	disheartening	for	an	organization	that	prides	itself	in	its	democracy.	These	numbers	somewhat	mirror	the	sentiments	Europeans	feel	for	democracy	in	their	individual	states,	as	47%	of	respondents	were	not	satisfied	with	how	democracy	works	in	their	country.	However,	more	people	were	satisfied	with	how	democracy	works	in	their	countries	as	51%	of	respondents	were	satisfied	with	democracy	in	their	country,	9%	higher	than	sentiments	for	the	EU.	Perhaps	this	dissatisfaction	relates	to	the	fact	that	55%	of	respondents	disagreed	with	the	statement	“my	voice	counts	in	the	EU.”	This	starkly	contrasts	with	how	respondents	felt	their	voice	counts	within	their	country,	as	55%	of	
																																																								90	European	Commission.	Standard	Eurobarometer	83-	Spring	2015-	Public	opinion	in	the	European	Union.	May	2015.	Accessed	January	27,	2017.	http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb83/eb83_publ_en.pdf.	91	Standard	Eurobarometer	85.	
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respondents	felt	that	their	voice	counts	nationally.	One	could	hypothesize	that	this	is	due	to	the	larger	size	of	the	EU,	which	could	make	it	seem	like	each	individual	voice	counts	less.	Only	41%	of	respondents	felt	that	the	voice	of	their	country	as	a	whole	was	taken	into	account	in	the	EU,	which	does	provide	ground	for	the	sentiment	of	conflict	of	interests	between	the	EU	as	a	whole	and	its	member	states.92		Additionally,	48%	of	respondents	felt	that	the	EU	was	“technocratic”	and	55%	of	respondents	felt	that	the	EU	was	inefficient.		Respondents	were	heavily	divided	on	the	question	of	the	EU	creating	conditions	for	more	jobs	in	Europe,	with	45%	of	member	state	citizens	saying	that	it	was	creating	conditions	for	more	jobs	and	46%	saying	that	it	was	failing	to	do	so.	Perhaps	the	strongest	criticism	was	that	80%	of	respondents	feel	that	the	EU	needed	a	clearer	message,	closely	followed	by	the	fact	that	72%	felt	that	the	EU	generated	too	much	red	tape.93		The	level	of	trust	European	citizens	had	for	the	EU	was	somewhat	mixed.	On	one	hand,	trust	in	the	EU	(33%)	surpassed	trust	in	national	governments	(27%)	by	5%.	Although,	having	the	trust	of	only	33%	of	respondents	seems	objectively	low	and	is	somewhat	disheartening.	Perhaps	this	data	testifies	to	the	general	lack	of	trust	in	all	forms	of	government	and	the	establishment.	Oddly	enough,	trust	in	the	European	Parliament,	European	Commission,	and	European	Central	Bank	all	surpassed	the	trust	levels	of	the	EU	itself	at	40%,	37%,	and	34%	respectively.	Similarly,	overall	sentiments	for	the	EU	were	somewhat	mixed,	and	generally	neutral.	Within	the	EU	28,	34%	of	respondents	said	that	the	EU	conjured	a	positive	image	for	them	and	38%	of	respondents	said	that	the	EU	conjured	a	neutral	image.	Only	27%	or	respondents	said	the	EU	conjured	up	a	negative																																																									92	Standard	Eurobarometer	85.	93	Standard	Eurobarometer	85.		
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image,	although	this	view	has	been	on	the	rise	since	2015.		While	this	may	not	seem	problematic,	as	overall	views	aren’t	dramatically	negative,	the	neutral	view	is	at	the	heart	of	this	issue.		Citizens	are	more	or	less	apathetic,	which	may	be	short	of	the	public	support	needed	to	promote	further	European	integration	as	it	might	require	active	support,	not	just	passive	tolerance.	94	Overall,	the	data	suggests	that	there	are	low	levels	of	input	and	output	legitimacy	for	the	EU.	Related	to	input	legitimacy,	the	first	underlying	problem	that	the	EU	faces	is	a	detachment	from	its	citizens	and	member-states,	both	from	a	democratic	deficit,	and	low	levels	of	trust	signifying	a	sense	of	separation.	Additionally,	while	citizens	do	not	appear	to	feel	a	conflict	between	a	European	identity	and	their	national	identities,	it	is	clear	that	the	national	identity	comes	first,	which	limits	the	authority	of	the	EU.	Finally,	the	very	purpose	of	the	EU	seems	unclear	because	the	narrative	of	the	EU’s	role	in	creating	peace	has	lost	power	as	memory	of	WWII	has	faded,	leaving	the	purpose	of	the	EU	in	its	citizen’s	eyes	unclear.		Moreover,	the	EU	suffers	from	a	perceived	low	level	of	effectiveness	and	efficiency,	which	causes	the	EU	to	have	low	levels	of	output	legitimacy.	To	an	extent,	the	data	also	suggests	that	the	EU	suffers	from	challenges	in	communication,	as	the	people	feel	it	seems	to	struggle	with	communicating	its	overall	purpose	and	value.			In	spite	of	these	difficulties,	it	seems	that	the	EU	citizens	appear	to	still	have	hope	for	the	EU	and	acknowledge	that	it	does	create	some	value,	largely	stemming	from	the	practical	difference	it	can	make	in	their	lives	(for	example,	from	free	movement.)		At	a	high	level,	EU	citizens	seem	to	support	the	EU	policies—even	wanting	the	policy	making	and	
																																																								94	Standard	Eurobarometer	85.	
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decision	making	power	of	the	EU	to	expand	to	a	degree—but	they	do	not	feel	a	passionate	matter	of	support	for	the	EU	due	to	the	aforementioned	underlying	issues.	While	the	people	maintain	a	sense	of	hope	about	the	overall	potential	for	the	European	Union,	this	hope	and	support	is	being	challenged	by	an	apparent	lack	of	input	legitimacy	and	output	legitimacy.	This	conflict	between	hope	for	the	EU	and	its	lack	of	legitimacy	has	led	to	the	existential	crisis	the	EU	is	currently	facing.	It	is	absolutely	imperative	that	the	EU	responds	to	the	crisis	in	its	input	legitimacy	and	output	legitimacy	before	the	people	lose	all	hope	in	the	European	Union.				 	
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CHAPTER	3:	THE	RISE	OF	EUROSCEPTICISM		 Following	over	a	half-century	of	increasing	economic,	political,	and	social	integration	in	Europe,	the	past	few	years	have	been	characterized	by	a	significant	increase	in	Euroscepticism	within	many	member	states	of	the	European	Union.	The	recent	challenges	related	to	the	debt	crisis,	refugee	crisis,	and	an	increase	in	terrorism	have	highlighted	how	integration	can	have	costs,	causing	some	to	wonder	if	such	costs	are	worth	the	benefits.	It	is	first	necessary	to	understand	these	recent	challenges	facing	Europe	that	have	contributed	to	an	increase	in	Euroscepticism.	Additionally,	it	is	necessary	to	understand	the	greater	context	that	has	contributed	to	the	recent	rise	of	Euroscepticism.	After	providing	background	on	the	challenges	facing	Europe	and	describing	the	context,	this	section	will	then	analyze	how	Euroscepticism	stemming	from	these	challenges	has	increased	in	the	United	Kingdom,	Germany,	and	France—the	three	most	powerful	countries	in	the	European	Union.	Finally,	this	section	will	connect	the	recent	challenges	Europe	has	faced	to	the	overarching	problems	with	the	input	legitimacy	and	output	legitimacy	of	the	EU.	
DEBT,	REFUGEES,	AND	TERRORISM	IN	EUROPE		 Economic	and	political	integration,	whether	through	a	supranationalist	entity	like	the	EU	or	simply	though	globalization,	has	many	benefits	including	more	efficient	productions	of	goods	from	economic	specialization,	shared	knowledge,	increased	trade,	and	(presumably)	political	stability	due	to	economic	interdependence.	These	benefits	unfortunately	have	costs	including:	a	restructuring	of	jobs	due	to	specialization,	feelings	of	threat	surrounding	national	identities,	and	the	complex	economic	dynamics	that	result	from	richer,	more	developed	countries	being	economically	tied	to	less	economically	
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advance	countries.	In	theory,	one	can	see	how	integration	can	be	better	for	everyone	under	free	trade	theory	and	its	supporting	arguments;	however,	Europe	is	now	seeing	the	costs	of	integration	in	a	very	tangible	manner.	Moreover,	Europe	is	realizing	that	integration	may	have	indirect	costs,	such	as	the	potential	security	threat	from	free	movement	within	the	EU	given	the	risk	of	terrorism,	that	Europe	did	not	expect.	These	costs	can	require	some	to	give	in	unequal	amounts	(ex:	richer	countries	providing	economic	support	for	poorer	countries),	which	can	give	rise	to	the	formation	of	groups	within	the	EU	and,	ultimately,	an	“us	versus	them”	mindset.			 While	many	issues	within	Europe	are	contributing	to	the	development	of	Euroscepticism,	three	of	the	most	significant	are:	economic	issues	stemming	from	the	debt	crisis	and	slow	economic	growth,	the	European	refugee	crisis	and	its	implications	for	immigration,	and	the	recent	increase	in	terrorist	attacks	in	Europe.	These	issues	raise	significant	questions	about	the	economic	stability,	culture,	and	security	of	Europe—three	concerns	which	are	central	to	the	survival	of	the	European	Union.	Whether	supranationalism	is	the	best	way	to	resolve	these	issues	is	debatable;	but	it	is	clear	that	if	the	EU	fails	to	make	progress	responding	to	these	issues,	member	nations	could	choose	to	forsake	integration	in	favor	of	the	perceived	benefits	of	providing	for	their	own	security	and	economic	policy	rather	than	trusting	other	member	states	to	buttress	their	efforts.			 	Economic	concerns	are	highly	significant	to	the	rise	of	Euroscepticism.	Since	2014,	the	EU	has	been	in	a	period	of	economic	stagnation	with	GDP	growth	hovering	around	2%.	While	this	is	fairly	healthy,	it	is	slower	than	pre-2008	levels	and	concerns	from	the	
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economic	recession	linger.95	The	economic	situation	is	identified	as	the	third	most	important	problem	facing	the	EU	today	in	the	Eurobarometer	survey.96	In	an	attempt	to	stimulate	economic	growth,	many	European	nations	took	on	debt,	which	has	led	to	today’s	debt	crisis	in	Europe.	Five	specific	nations	(Portugal,	Italy,	Ireland,	Greece,	and	Spain—humorously	abbreviated	as	PIIGS),	took	on	an	exceptionally	large	amount	of	debt.	The	ability	of	these	nations	to	pay	back	their	debts	was	under	question,	and	the	risk	of	default	imminent	at	the	height	of	the	debt	crisis	in	2010.	The	loaning	countries	ultimately	needed	the	bailout	just	as	much	as	the	loan	receiving	countries,	because	the	bailouts	were	necessary	to	prevent	the	banks	of	the	lending	countries	from	going	under.	Consequently,	the	IMF,	European	Union,	and	ECB	all	stepped	in	to	craft	bailouts	and	avoid	default.	If	any	of	these	countries,	most	significantly,	Greece,	were	to	default	the	entire	economic	system	risked	failure	due	to	the	far-reaching	impact	of	bank	failures	and	the	impact	the	defaults	would	have	the	value	of	the	Euro.	In	2011,	the	Bank	of	England	labeled	the	debt	crisis	as	“the	most	serious	financial	crisis	at	least	since	the	1930s,	if	not	ever.”	Since	2011,	the	debt	crisis	has	stabilized	somewhat	due	to	supranational	intervention,	but	it	is	still	a	relevant	concern.97	The	economic	fears	and	debt	crisis	contributed	to	an	“us	versus	them”	mindset	for	lending	and	borrowing	countries,	leading	to	today’s	level	of	Euroscepticism.		Another	key	issue	confronting	the	EU	is	the	European	refugee	crisis.	In	2015	alone,	over	one	million	refugees	arrived	in	Europe	with	hopes	for	a	better	life.98	The	arrival	of	these	refugees	has	raised	many	questions	in	Europe:	Where	should	the	refugees	go?	How																																																									95	"European	Union	GDP	Annual	Growth	Rate."	Trading	Economics.	Accessed	April	8,	2017.	http://www.tradingeconomics.com/european-union/gdp-annual-growth-rate.			96	Standard	Eurobarometer	85.	97	Kenny,	Thomas.	"What	is	the	European	Debt	Crisis?"	The	Balance.	Last	modified	February	21,	2017.	Accessed	April	8,	2017.	https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-european-debt-crisis-416918.		98	"Migrant	Crisis:	Migration	to	Europe	Explained	in	Seven	Charts."	BBC.	Last	modified	March	4,	2016.	Accessed	April	8,	2017.	http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911.		
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can	the	refugee	programs	be	paid	for?	Immigration,	largely	stemming	from	the	refugee	crisis,	is	voted	the	most	important	problem	facing	Europe	to	date	with	48%	of	the	population	agreeing.99	Countries	where	the	refugees	have	been	arriving	(Italy,	Greece,	Hungary)	have	faced	a	disproportionate	burden.	While	Germany	had	the	most	total	asylum	applications,	Hungary	had	the	most	applications	on	a	per	capita	basis	with	approximately	1,800	refugees	per	100,000	Hungarians.	In	an	attempt	to	relieve	the	refugee	burden	on	arrival	nations,	the	EU	instituted	a	quota	system	where	other	EU	member	states	will	accept	a	specified	amount	of	refugees	from	Italy	and	Greece,	two	nations	facing	particularly	severe	refugee	burdens.100	Still,	many	arrival	nations	or	countries	hosting	a	large	amount	of	refugees	are	of	the	opinion	that	they	are	carrying	a	disproportionate	amount	of	the	refugee	burden.	This	leads	to	a	high	amount	of	tension	within	the	EU	relating	to	the	hosting	and	funding	of	refugees,	especially	given	that	this	humanitarian	crisis	shows	no	signs	of	ending	soon.	Additionally,	the	possibilities	of	the	refugees	remaining	in	Europe	for	the	distant	future	raises	tensions	related	to	significant	cultural	divides,	language	barriers,	and	job	placement.		In	an	attempt	to	relieve	pressures	on	Europe	from	refugees,	the	Balkan	migration	route	was	closed	and	the	EU	made	a	deal	with	Turkey	in	March	of	2016.	In	this	deal,	Turkey	“agreed	to	stop	asylum	seekers	from	crossing	by	sea	to	the	Greek	islands”	and	refugees	currently	settled	in	the	Greek	islands	were	to	be	transferred	to	Turkey.101	In	exchange,	the	EU	agreed	to	pay	€6	billion	to	Turkey	to	assist	the	refugee	community	hosted	by	Turkey																																																									99	Standard	Eurobarometer	85.		100	“Migrant	Crisis”	101	Squires,	Nick.	"A	year	on	from	EU-Turkey	deal,	refugees	and	migrants	in	limbo	commit	suicide	and	suffer	from	trauma."	The	Telegraph.	March	14,	2017.	Accessed	April	29,	2017.	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/14/year-eu-turkey-deal-refugees-migrants-limbo-commit-suicide-suffer/.	
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and	the	EU	would	accept	some	Syrian	asylum	seekers	currently	in	Turkey	to	other	European	countries.102	Unfortunately,	these	efforts	to	reduce	the	stress	of	refugees	on	Europe	fell	far	short	of	expectations	and	the	refugee	inflow	is	still	far	beyond	what	Europe	seems	able—or	willing—to	handle.			 In	2015,	there	was	an	unprecedented	amount	of	terrorist	attacks	in	Europe,	which	made	terrorism	a	major	concern	for	the	EU.	Terrorism	was	voted	the	second	most	important	problem	facing	Europe	in	the	Spring	2016	Eurobarometer	survey.103	The	increase	in	concern	for	terrorism	raises	many	questions	that	the	EU	must	face	about	the	degree	of	common	security	and	intelligence	related	to	terrorism.	This	concern	also	heavily	relates	to	concerns	about	refugees	and	immigration,	as	both	connect	to	fears	about	open	border	within	Europe.	Additionally,	some	fear	that	terrorists	could	mask	as	refugees	to	enter	Europe.	While	these	concerns	could	unite	Europe	against	the	common	threat,	different	opinions	on	how	to	respond	to	the	threat	also	raise	tensions.		 These	three	issues	have	pushed	the	EU	to	a	breaking	point,	as	Europe	seemingly	faces	challenges	from	all	corners.	These	issues	have	caused	Europeans	to	question	not	only	the	ability	of	the	EU	to	effectively	respond	to	these	issues	as	its	output	legitimacy	falls	into	question,	but	also	to	question	if	supranationalism	is	even	the	best	way	to	confront	these	issues	as	many	begin	to	think	that	the	costs	outweigh	the	benefits.	While	it	is	true	that	these	issues	play	a	significant	role	in	the	recent	rise	of	Euroscepticism,	it	is	also	necessary	to	understand	the	greater	context	that	has	factored	into	the	rise	of	Euroscepticism.	
																																																								102	Gogou,	Kondylia.	"The	EU-Turkey	deal:	Europe's	year	of	shame."	Amnesty	International.	March	20,	2017.	Accessed	April	29,	2017.	https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/03/the-eu-turkey-deal-europes-year-of-shame/.	103	Standard	Eurobarometer	85.	
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OTHER	FACTORS	RELEVANT	TO	EUROSCEPTICISM	While	the	tangible	issues	of	the	refugee	crisis,	economic	concerns	over	the	recession	and	debt	crisis,	and	increased	fear	of	terrorist	attacks	have	contributed	to	the	rise	in	Euroscepticism	by	casting	doubt	on	the	output	legitimacy	of	the	EU,	these	issues	are	not	the	only	reason	for	the	recent	increase	in	Euroscepticism.	Euroscepticism	has	existed	since	the	beginning	of	European	integration	following	WWII,	well	before	any	of	these	issues	took	center	stage.	However,	the	prevalence	of	Euroscepticism	has	undeniably	increased	in	recent	years.	Euroscepticism	has	become	increasing	popular	among	formerly	moderate	individuals,	whereas	it	used	to	be	solely	championed	by	those	on	the	political	fringes.	While	this	increase	in	Euroscepticism	is	largely	due	to	the	falling	input	and	output	legitimacy	of	the	EU,	it	also	must	also	be	viewed	in	greater	context.	As	technology	has	rapidly	developed	and	facilitated	communication,	the	fringe	Eurosceptic	groups	can	now	communicate	their	positions	easier	than	ever	before,	which	allows	their	messages	to	spread	and	their	support	to	grow.	In	essence,	the	advancement	of	technology	that	facilitates	communication	(such	as	social	media),	has	contributed	to	the	ease	in	which	Euroscepticism	has	spread.104		Additionally,	since	WWII	the	entire	globe	has	become	more	connected	as	economic	ties	between	nations	have	grown,	creating	unprecedented	levels	of	globalization.	The	increased	globalization	has	led	to	increased	economic	growth	and	specialization	under	the	theory	of	comparative	advantage	proposed	by	Ricardo	and	Smith,	but	the	resulting	shift	in	economic	production	has	caused	some	in	wealthier	nations	to	lose	jobs	that	can	be	done	more	efficiently	in	the	developing	world.	As	a	result,	there	has	been	increasing	anti-globalization	sentiments	across	the	globe	in	many	developed	areas,	including	Europe.	To																																																									104	EU	Interviews	(see	Appendix	6)	
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some,	these	feelings	of	anti-globalization	can	lead	to	hyper-nationalism,	which	can	then	translate	to	Euroscepticism	if	other	European	nations	are	viewed	as	economic	competition	rather	than	sources	of	economic	growth.	105		Finally,	the	increase	in	Euroscepticism	must	be	viewed	in	the	context	of	the	global	rise	of	anti-establishment	sentiments.	There	has	been	an	upsurge	in	populism,	or	the	political	support	for	the	interests	and	wellbeing	of	the	common	people,	around	the	globe.	These	anti-establishment	views	have	largely	has	portrayed	the	political	elite	as	at	odds	with	the	interests	of	the	common	citizen.106	This	concept	of	the	anti-establishment	brand	of	populism	factors	into	the	lack	of	input	legitimacy	of	the	EU,	as	European	citizens	view	the	elite	EU	politicians	and	technocrats	as	detached	from	their	problems.	Therefore,	the	rise	of	anti-establishment	populism	also	factors	into	the	increase	in	Euroscepticism.	107			While	there	are	many	factors	contributing	to	the	increase	in	Euroscepticism,	there	are	a	few	factors	that	contribute	to	support	for	the	EU.	One	of	which	is	the	fact	that	free	movement	within	the	Schengen	area	has	contributed	to	feelings	of	connection	and	solidarity	within	Europe.		This	idea	can	be	supported	by	the	fact	that	most	citizens	viewed	“free	movement”	as	the	primary	meaning	of	the	EU	to	be	for	them.108	Another	factor	that	can	increase	support	for	the	EU	is	the	increasing	threat	of	Europe’s	eastern	neighbor,	Russia.	As	the	Ukrainian	civil	war	rages	on	and	Putin	continues	to	flex	Russia’s	muscles	on	the	global	stage,	the	threat	of	Russia	is	becoming	more	prominent.	On	one	hand,	this	threat	could	be	perceived	as	a	literal	military	threat,	as	many	
																																																								105	EU	Interviews	(see	Appendix	6)	106	"Populist."	Merriam-Webster.	Accessed	April	08,	2017.	https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/populist.	107	EU	Interviews	(see	Appendix	6)	108	Standard	Eurobarometer	85	
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people	fear	Russia	could	be	looking	to	increase	its	regional	power	by	gaining	land	in	Eastern	Europe.109	The	threat	is	also	political,	as	talk	of	Russian	influence	in	elections	and	media	influence	in	Europe	has	grown.	When	the	Russian	threat	has	historically	increased,	European	countries	have	a	tendency	of	banding	together	for	common	support	and	strength.	This	could	be	beneficial	for	the	EU	if	nations	set	aside	their	doubts	of	the	EU	in	favor	of	common	strength	against	the	Russian	threat.		All	in	all,	the	recent	rise	of	Euroscepticism	relates	to	a	perfect	storm	of	three	European	problems	that	have	cast	doubt	on	the	output	legitimacy	of	the	EU:	the	recession	and	resulting	debt	crisis,	the	refugee	crisis,	and	the	increasing	threat	of	terrorism.	These	three	factors,	in	combination	with	outside	factors	such	as	opposition	to	globalization,	widespread	anti-establishment	populism	movements,	and	the	advancement	of	technology	has	contributed	to	a	rise	in	Euroscepticism.	All	of	these	surface	level	issues	shed	light	on	severe	underlying	issues	with	the	input	legitimacy	and	output	legitimacy	of	the	EU.		While	these	issues	impact	all	member	states	of	the	European	Union110,	the	impact	on	the	UK,	Germany,	and	France	is	especially	important.	These	three	countries	have	the	largest	economies	of	the	European	Union,	and	they	have	been	politically	dominant	in	the	creation	and	development	of	the	EU.111	Germany	and	France	were	particularly	important	for	the	creation	of	the	EU,	as	they	chose	to	set	aside	a	history	of	war	and	instead	foster	cooperation	in	hopes	of	peace.	Aside	from	history,	the	economic	strength	of	these	nations	
																																																								109	O'Connor,	Tom.	"U.S.	conducts	'Savage	Wolf'	NATO	drills	in	Lithuania	amid	Russia	tensions."	Newsweek.	April	06,	2017.	Accessed	April	08,	2017.	http://www.newsweek.com/us-military-tanks-troops-lithuania-savage-wolf-drills-580018.	110	For	example,	the	2017	election	in	the	Netherlands	also	featured	a	prominent	anti-EU	candidate.		"Dutch	Elections:	All	You	Need	to	Know."	The	Guardian.	Last	modified	March	2,	2017.	Accessed	April	8,	2017.	https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/02/	dutch-parliamentary-elections-everything-you-need-to-know-brexit-vote-trump-geert-wilders.			111	“European	Union	GDP	Annual	Growth	Rate."	 	
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gives	them	a	position	of	power	in	the	EU,	which	they	frequently	use	to	shape	the	direction	of	the	EU.	The	fate	of	the	EU	heavily	rests	with	these	three	states;	hence	it	is	necessary	to	give	particular	attention	to	the	current	rise	of	Euroscepticism	in	all	three	states.		
THE	UNITED	KINGDOM	OF	GREAT	BRITAIN	AND	NORTHERN	IRELAND	The	first	nation	to	analyze	is	the	United	Kingdom	(UK),	as	it	is	currently	in	negotiations	to	leave	the	EU..	It	may	seem	counterintuitive	to	discuss	the	UK	when	analyzing	the	future	of	the	European	Union;	however,	it	is	necessary	to	discuss	the	UK	for	this	very	reason.	The	UK	has	a	history	of	a	strong	national	identity,	such	that	it	has	historically	resisted	integration	with	the	European	subcontinent.	Brexit	(a	common	term	for	the	exit	of	Britain	from	the	EU)	is	the	first	case	of	identity	and	other	controversies	foreshadowing	a	possible	reversal	of	integration	in	the	European	Union.	Additionally,	the	prosperity	or	hardships	of	the	UK	once	it	leaves	the	EU	will	factor	into	public	perception	of	the	benefits	and	detriments	of	the	EU	itself,	which	ultimately	impacts	the	future	of	the	EU.	Finally,	there	are	some	scenarios	in	which	the	UK	may	not	ultimately	leave	the	EU	(for	example:	if	the	UK	holds	another	referendum	to	attempt	to	change	the	Brexit	vote),	so	it	is	important	to	still	consider	the	impact	of	the	UK	on	the	EU	from	that	perspective	as	well.112		Nationalism	exists	within	the	UK	on	multiple	levels,	both	in	regard	Europe	as	well	as	at	a	subnational	level.	Northern	Ireland,	Wales,	and	Scotland	all	have	their	own	nationalist	sentiments	that	must	be	considered.	In	2014,	a	referendum	was	held	for	Scottish	independence	and,	while	the	margin	was	close,	those	who	favored	remaining	in	the	UK	
																																																								112	Interviews	with	EU	officials,	March	13-17,	2017.	(see	Appendix	6)	
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ultimately	won.113	Nonetheless,	Scottish	nationalist	sentiments	have	not	dissipated	since	the	referendum,	and	some	suggest	that	they	have	even	grown.		While	these	sub-nationalist	sentiments	must	be	considered	for	the	UK,	nationalism	has	historically	been	rendered	more	successfully	at	a	national	level	with	regards	to	European	integration.	The	UK	exists	on	a	separate	island—	both	literally	and	metaphorically	distant	from	the	rest	of	Europe.	The	country	has	been	a	reluctant	participant	in	the	EU	at	best,	always	advocating	for	its	own	independent	identity	as	seen	through	its	refusal	to	adopt	the	Euro	and	its	strict	protection	of	its	national	borders	by	refusing	to	adopt	free	movement	from	the	Schengen	agreement.114			The	relationship	between	the	UK	and	the	EU	has	always	been	a	bit	rocky,	at	best.	In	1975,	the	UK	held	a	referendum	to	leave	the	EEC.	While	this	referendum	concluded	with	a	large	majority	voting	in	favor	of	staying	in	the	EEC,	the	simple	fact	that	it	was	held	shows	the	sense	of	division	between	the	UK	and	the	greater	European	community.	Since	then,	various	attempts	to	hold	a	referendum	to	withdraw	have	been	proposed.		It	was	the	platform	of	the	Labour	Party	during	the	1983	election,	although	the	Labour	Party	lost	to	the	Conservative	Party	with	Margaret	Thatcher	by	a	large	margin.	In	1997	a	separate	Referendum	Party	was	created	on	the	basis	of	leaving	the	EU,	although	it	only	achieved	2.6%	of	the	vote.	More	recently,	there	were	calls	for	Prime	Minister	David	Cameron	to	hold	a	referendum	on	EU	membership	since	2012.	While	he	initially	resisted,	the	pressure	grew	such	that	he	agreed	to	hold	a	referendum	if	re-elected	in	2015.	When	he	was	re-elected,	he	
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followed	through	with	his	promise	and	received	support	from	Parliament	with	the	European	Union	Referendum	Act	of	2015.		Initially,	Prime	Minister	Cameron	worked	to	avoid	a	referendum	by	attempting	to	renegotiate	the	terms	of	the	UK	relationship	with	the	EU,	as	he	did	not	support	leaving	but	felt	the	public	pressure	to	support	UK	interests.	In	early	February	of	2016,	Cameron	publically	announced	the	terms	of	a	proposed	deal	between	the	UK	and	the	EU.		Most	people	supported	the	key	measures	of	the	deal	(preventing	a	“European	super	state,”	promoting	internal	economic	competition,	allowing	the	UK	to	not	adopt	the	Euro,	and	preventing	new	EU	migrants	from	receiving	in	work	benefits)	for	not	going	far	enough	to	protect	the	interests	of	the	UK	(see	Appendix	5).115	As	a	result	of	this	criticism	of	the	proposed	deal,	Prime	Minister	Cameron	announced	that	a	referendum	on	EU	membership	would	be	held	on	June	23,	2016.116	In	June	of	2016,	just	a	few	weeks	before	the	UK	Referendum	on	EU	membership,	the	Observer	conducted	a	national	survey	that	suggested	otherwise.	In	this	survey,	46%	of	people	indicated	they	were	in	favor	of	leaving	the	EU,	38%	said	they	were	in	favor	of	remaining	in	the	EU,	and	17%	were	unsure.	Perhaps	this	correlated	to	the	fact	that	only	13%	of	respondents	felt	that	being	European	was	a	large	part	of	who	they	were,	in	comparison	to	the	61%	who	felt	it	did	not	describe	them,	which	suggests	an	identity	conflict	was	present.	Yet,	only	32%	of	respondents	felt	personally	worried	about	UK	membership	in	the	EU.	In	comparison,	58%	of	respondents	were	worried	about	terrorism,	
																																																								115	Dahlgreen,	Will.	"Draft	EU	deal	gives	boost	to	Leave	campaign."	February	4,	2016.	Accessed	April	08,	2017.	https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/02/04/eu-referendum-leave-leads-nine/.	116	Iyengar,	Rishi.	"These	3	Facts	Explain	Why	the	U.K.	Held	the	'Brexit'	Referendum."	Time	Inc.	Last	modified	June	24,	2016.	Accessed	April	8,	2017.	http://time.com/4381184/uk-brexit-european-union-referendum-cameron/.  
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53%	of	respondents	were	worried	about	immigration,	and	46%	of	respondents	worried	about	the	economy.117	This	suggests	that	the	EU	itself	may	not	be	the	problem,	but	the	perceived	connection	of	the	EU	to	the	people’s	concerns	about	the	economy,	terrorism,	and	immigration	was	the	driving	factor	of	the	vote.	The	survey	found	that	views	on	immigration	were	most	likely	to	impact	voting	in	the	referendum,	as	“49%	say	it	[immigration]	will	influence	how	they	vote,	and	this	figure	increases	to	72%	among	those	who	will	vote	to	leave.”118	Further	evidence	that	terrorism	and	immigration	were	key	issues	in	the	vote	include	the	fact	that	“of	those	questioned,	38%	said	they	had	changed	their	views	on	the	issue	over	the	previous	six	months,	a	time	frame	that	included	the	Paris	terror	attacks,	the	worsening	refugee	crisis	and	the	mass	sexual	assaults	in	Cologne	on	New	Year’s	Eve.”119		The	economic	impact	of	leaving	the	EU	was	also	relevant	in	the	survey,	although	it	was	mixed.	Those	who	favored	leaving	were	more	likely	to	cite	immigration	as	their	motivation,	and	those	who	favored	staying	were	more	likely	to	cite	potential	economic	harm	from	leaving	the	EU	as	a	reason	for	staying.	That	being	said,	more	Britons	felt	that	Brexit	would	be	good	for	their	finances,	with	38%	responding	it	would	be	financially	beneficial	versus	30%	responding	that	it	would	be	financially	detrimental.	Even	if	Eurosceptics	felt	that	the	EU	was	economically	beneficial,	54%	of	respondents	believed	that	“the	effects	of	immigration	now	outweigh	any	trade	benefits	the	EU	brings.”120	From	this	survey,	it	was	clear	that	some	groups	supported	leaving	the	EU	more	
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strongly	than	others.	For	example,	as	would	be	expected,	individuals	that	politically	identified	with	the	United	Kingdom	Independence	Party	(which,	as	the	name	suggests,	argues	for	UK	independence	from	the	EU)	favored	leaving	at	83%	in	support,	whereas	members	of	the	Lib	Dem,	Green,	Conservative,	and	Labour	parties	were	more	likely	to	be	in	favor	of	staying	in	the	EU.	The	correlation	of	Euroscepticism	was	especially	noteworthy	with	age,	as	“younger	Britons	are	more	likely	to	vote	to	remain	in	the	EU	while	older	Britons	are	more	likely	to	favour	Brexit,”	perhaps	because	younger	Britons	have	always	had	a	stronger	European	identity	because	they	have	no	memory	of	an	independent	United	Kingdom.121			 While	this	survey	provided	some	premonition	that	the	vote	to	leave	was	gaining	momentum,	the	vote	itself	occurred	on	June	23	of	2016	with	72.2%	voter	turnout.	51.9%	of	voters	elected	to	leave	the	EU	and	48.1%	voted	to	remain.	The	vote	itself	showed	many	of	the	same	demographic	trends	that	the	earlier	Observer	survey	revealed.	For	example,	75%	of	voters	aged	24	and	under	voted	to	stay	in	the	EU.	Additionally,	individuals	with	higher	education	and	individuals	with	a	higher	median	income	(above	£30K)	were	more	likely	to	vote	in	favor	of	remaining	in	the	EU.122		 Two	key	areas	of	the	UK,	Scotland	and	Northern	Ireland,	favored	remaining	in	the	EU	with	62%	and	55.8%	of	the	vote	in	each	area,	respectively.	The	fact	that	these	areas	favored	remaining	has	raised	talk	of	new	independence	referendums	in	both	areas,	such	that	the	two	areas	could	remain	in	the	EU.	Perhaps,	this	will	provide	fuel	for	these	sub-
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nationalism	movements	to	succeed.123			 On	a	higher	level,	the	result	of	the	“Brexit”	proceedings	has	significance	not	only	for	the	territories	of	Scotland	and	Northern	Ireland,	but	for	other	member	states	of	the	EU.	As	the	UK	prepares	to	leave	the	EU,	the	rest	of	Europe	is	watching.	If	the	UK	appears	to	economically	and	socially	thrive	following	its	presumed	exit	from	the	EU,	its	success	could	spark	similar	nationalist	movements	in	other	member	states	to	leave	the	EU.	Perhaps	the	biggest	takeaway	from	the	Brexit	vote	is	the	significance	of	a	European	identity	in	contributing	to	support	for	the	EU,	as	that	seemed	to	be	a	large	factor	in	the	vote.		
THE	FEDERAL	REPUBLIC	OF	GERMANY		 Following	World	War	II	(WWII),	Germany	was	in	economic	and	political	turmoil.	The	country	was	struggling	to	rebuild	following	the	devastation	of	WWII,	both	politically	and	economically.	Germany	drafted	a	new	constitution	and	implemented	key	economic	stimulus	measures	that	ultimately	led	to	the	growth	of	the	German	economy,	which	is	now	the	largest	economy	in	the	EU.	These	political	and	economic	reforms	transformed	the	nation	into	a	current	leader	within	the	EU,	giving	Germany	a	significant	degree	of	influence	on	other	member	states	and	the	direction	of	the	EU	as	a	whole.		One	of	the	most	important	changes	Germany	made	to	rebuild	after	WWII	was	design	a	new	constitution	entitled	Basic	Law	for	the	Federal	Republic	of	Germany	(West	Germany)	in	1949,	which	Eastern	Germany	later	adopted	following	reunification	in	1990.	After	the	devastation	that	hyper-nationalism	and	fascism	had	wreaked	on	Germany	and	the	entire	European	subcontinent,	the	country	was	determined	to	avoid	repeating	history	by	severely																																																									123	"EU	Referendum	Results."	BBC	News.	Accessed	April	08,	2017.	http://www.bbc.com/news/politics/eu_referendum/results.		
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restricting	the	ability	of	hyper-nationalist	sentiments	to	be	realized	by	the	German	government.	The	Basic	Law	for	the	Federal	Republic	of	Germany	intentionally	replaced	the	extreme	form	of	proportional	representation	that	contributed	to	Hitler’s	rise	with	a	mixed	form	of	proportional	representation,	which	requires	a	minimum	of	5%	of	the	vote	for	representation,	and	elections	in	single	member	constituencies.	These	changes	helped	prevent	extreme	hyper-nationalist	parties	from	being	represented	in	German	Parliament,	which	prevents	them	from	gaining	power	and	spreading	their	views.124		Following	WWII,	Germany	was	in	economic	turmoil.	Initially,	Germany	benefited	from	American	aid	for	economic	stimulus	through	the	Marshall	Plan	in	the	late	1940s.	This	helped	the	economy	survive,	and	the	Germany	economy	began	to	thrive	in	the	1950s	and	1960s	when	the	newly	rebuilt	Western	German	government	was	established	and	implemented	policies	to	cut	inflation,	reduce	controls,	cut	high	marginal	tax	rates.	These	stimulus	measures	helped	the	Western	German	economy	grow	tremendously,	and	lay	the	economic	foundation	for	the	strong	German	economy	of	today.125		This	economic	strength	is	a	large	form	of	the	influence	Germany	has	in	the	European	Union,	as	the	nation	is	a	key	provider	of	much	needed	loans	to	the	struggling	PIIGS	countries.	Moreover,	Germany	issues	a	significant	degree	of	power	over	the	European	Central	Bank	(ECB),	which	can	be	seen	by	the	fact	that	Germany	insisted	that	the	ECB	headquarters	be	in	Germany.		Over	the	past	half-century	as	Germany	underwent	significant	political	and	economic	changes	to	become	the	democratic	leader	it	is	today,	a	suppression	of	extremes—especially	
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hyper-nationalism—	has	consistently	been	an	undercurrent.	The	German	Chancellor	since	2005,	Angela	Merkel	of	the	Christian	Democratic	Union	(CDU)	party,	has	consistently	faced	pressure	from	both	the	left	and	the	right.	As	leader	of	the	CDU	party,	Merkel	general	opts	for	a	centrist	route	with	right	leaning	tendencies.	The	CDU	is	a	centre-right	party	that	is	conservative	on	social	issues	but	supports	a	free	market	economy,	social	welfare,	and	European	integration.126	While	this	tactic	largely	aligns	with	the	greater	philosophy	of	post-WWII	Germany,	its	effectiveness	seems	to	be	faltering	as	Merkel’s	ability	to	win	reelection	in	2017	is	coming	into	question.	Merkel’s	biggest	challenger	in	the	2017	election	appears	to	be	a	Social	Democrat,	Martin	Schulz,	who	is	the	former	President	of	the	European	Parliament	and	is	largely	in	favor	of	the	European	Union.	Polls	suggests	that	Schulz	would	win	50%	of	the	popular	vote,	although	the	popular	vote	in	Germany	is	irrelevant	as	Chancellors	are	selected	by	the	Parliament.127		Over	the	years,	Merkel	and	the	CDU	party	has	largely	supported	the	EU,	although	they	want	the	EU	to	function	on	German	terms.	This	can	most	easily	be	demonstrated	by	Merkel’s	insistence	that	Italy	and	Greece	implement	austerity	measures,	which	reflects	German	economic	views128	Germany	has	a	high	level	of	tension	with	many	of	the	highly	indebted	EU	states.	For	example,	a	2015	poll	found	that	47%	of	Germans	wanted	Greece	to	
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leave	the	EU,	and	many	supporter	tough	austerity	measures.129	This	data	illustrates	how	Germany	generally	supports	the	EU,	but	want	it	to	function	on	German	terms—especially	financially.	Another	key	aspect	of	the	European	debt	crisis	is	that	it	revealed	the	Merkel’s	status	as	the	de	facto	leader	of	the	European	Union	as	she	took	the	lead	on	the	bailout	negotiations	and	is	the	EU’s	longest-serving	incumbent	head	of	government,	which	perhaps	relates	to	German’s	general	support	for	the	EU	as	their	leader	generally	plays	a	significant	role	in	the	EU	itself.	This	can	make	Germany	feel	less	detached	from	the	EU	than	other	countries,	and	can	also	make	Germany	feel	that	its	national	interests	will	be	protected.	While	Germany	generally	supports	the	EU,	the	shifting	power	of	Merkel	and	the	CDU	is	significant	because	it	largely	signifies	some	level	of	German	discontent	with	her	approach	to	the	EU.		Specifically,	Merkel’s	shifting	power	in	Germany	largely	seems	to	stem	from	her	role	in	the	European	refugee	crisis	and	the	increase	in	terrorism.	Merkel	has	been	very	open	to	Germany	receiving	refugees	during	the	European	migrant	crisis,	which	is	credited	for	leading	to	her	approval	ratings	falling	to	54%	in	2015—the	lowest	level	since	2011.	In	a	2016	survey	by	ARD,	65%	of	respondents	were	not	satisfied	with	Merkel’s	policy	on	refugees.	Terrorism	is	also	causing	issues	for	Merkel,	as	her	approval	levels	fell	to	47%	following	the	two	terrorists	attacks	on	German	soil	in	July	of	2016.130	Merkel’s	primary	challenger	in	this	election,	Schulz	of	the	Social	Democratic	Party	of	Germany	(SDP),	largely	supports	European	integration	from	an	ideological	perspective.	As	the	leader	of	the	SDP,	Schulz	and	the	SDP	party	work	to	promote	social	welfare,	as	well	as																																																									129	McHugh,	Jess.	"Greek	Debt	Crisis:	Poll	Shows	Finland	And	Germany	Still	Tough	On	Greece,	But	Support	For	A	Grexit	Wanes."	International	Business	Times.	October	7,	2015.	Accessed	April	8,	2017.		http://www.ibtimes.com/greek-debt-crisis-poll-shows-finland-germany-still-tough-greece-support-grexit-wanes-2003698.	130Ehni,	Ellen.	"Majority	Against	EU	Accession	of	Turkey."	GermanyTrend.	April	8,	2016.	Accessed	April	8,	2017.	https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/deutschlandtrend-585.html.	
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the	values	of	social	democracy:	freedom,	justice,	and	social	solidarity.	Schulz	and	the	SDP	support	the	EU	not	only	to	the	extent	that	it	can	bring	practical	benefits	to	Germany,	but	also	on	an	ideological	level	as	European	integration	is	in	line	with	the	party’s	values.131	Schulz	shows	how	populism,	or	political	support	for	the	common	man,	doesn’t	necessarily	mean	Euroscepticism.	Schulz	gained	popularity	largely	due	to	his	image	as	a	politician	for	the	people.	He	stands	not	only	for	the	common	German,	but	also	for	the	common	European.	In	fact,	one	of	his	campaign	slogans	is	“Make	Europe	Great	Again,”	shedding	light	on	how	populism	need	not	oppose	European	integration.	Schulz	campaigns	on	the	fact	that	European	integration,	when	done	thoughtfully,	can	benefit	the	common	man	through	economic	growth.132		Fringe	parties,	most	notably	the	far-right	nationalist	Alternative	for	Germany	party	(AFD),	are	also	gaining	power	in	response	to	the	discontent	of	some	German’s	with	Merkel’s	EU	dealings.	While	the	AFD	is	far	from	gaining	the	majority	of	support	with	only	16%	approval	ratings,	the	AFD	is	significant	because	the	party’s	approval	ratings	have	been	consistently	growing	since	2013.	Moreover,	it	is	highly	likely	that	the	AFD	party	will	gain	increased	presence	in	the	federal	Parliament	following	the	2017	elections.133	The	AFD	champions	German	nationalism,	and	strongly	opposes	the	EU.	Frans	Weise	of	the	AFD	claims	that	when	the	AFD	presumably	gains	increased	representation	in	German	Parliament	in	2017,	“'Dexit'	will	be	at	the	top	of	our	agenda,"	referring	to	an	initiative	for																																																									131	Conradt,	David	P.	"Social	Democratic	Party	of	Germany	(SPD)."	Encyclopædia	Britannica.	December	16,	2015.	Accessed	April	29,	2017.	https://www.britannica.com/topic/Social-Democratic-Party-of-Germany.	132	Stelzenmüller,	Constanze.	"Meet	Martin	Schulz,	the	Europhile	populist	shaking	up	Germany’s	elections."	February	27,	2017.	Accessed	April	08,	2017.	https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2017/02/27/meet-martin-schultz-the-europhile-populist-shaking-up-germanys-elections/?utm_term=.ff3f9db84861.	133	Davis,	Austin.	"Social	Democrat	threatens	Merkel’s	stronghold	in	Germany	elections."	The	Washington	Times.	February	06,	2017.	Accessed	April	08,	2017.	http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/feb/6/martin-schulz-seen-as-threat-to-angela-merkel-in-g/.	
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Germany	to	exit	the	EU.	While	this	would	be	quite	difficult	to	realize	not	only	because	the	majority	of	Germans	seem	to	be	support	the	EU,	but	also	because	the	German	Constitution	doesn’t	currently	allow	for	a	national	referendum,	the	fact	that	the	AFD	is	gaining	popularity	suggests	that	its	ideas	are	gaining	support.134		It	seems	that	discontent	of	Merkel’s	approach	to	the	EU	has	led	to	two	political	movements.	The	first	of	which	is	the	rise	of	the	hyper-nationalist	and	Eurosceptic	AFD	party.	It	is	clear	that	the	stress	of	the	refugee	crisis	and	the	threat	of	terror	are	leaving	a	significance	impact	on	Germany,	building	on	its	economic	divide	with	heavily	indebted	EU	member	states.	While	Euroscepticism	is	far	from	becoming	the	majority	view	in	Germany,	this	analysis	shows	that	the	issues	confounding	the	EU	can	also	impact	national	political	shifts,	as	Merkel’s	authority	is	threatened.	The	second	movement	is	the	rise	of	Schulz	and	the	Social	Democrats	who	argue	that	European	integration	can	benefit	the	German	citizens	when	done	well	and	that	European	integration	is	important	for	European	values.	Perhaps	the	rise	of	Schulz	alludes	to	a	different	understanding	of	the	purpose	of	the	EU—a	more	values	based	approach	in	comparison	to	Merkel’s	seemingly	more	pragmatic	approach.	Perhaps	Merkel	will	continue	to	lead	Germany,	but	it	is	clear	that	her	policies	are	being	challenged	more	so	than	ever	before.	While	Germans	still	appear	to	approve	of	the	EU	more	so	than	Britons	as	a	Forsa	poll	conducted	in	Germany	around	the	time	of	the	Brexit	vote	found	that	79%	of	Germans	would	vote	in	favor	of	remaining	in	the	EU	if	they	had	a	similar	referendum.135	Germany,	by	far	is	the	most	in	favor	of	the	EU	of	the	three	countries	discussed,	perhaps	because	it	has	the	highest	degree	of	influence	over	the	EU	and	can	largely	shape	the	EU	based	on	German	interests.	Therefore,	it	feels	a	stronger	sense	of																																																									134	Breitenbach,	Dagmar.		135	Breitenbach,	Dagmar.	
	 66	 	 	
connection	with	the	EU	than	most	member	states.	The	power	of	connection	with	the	EU	leading	to	EU	support	can	also	suggest	the	danger	a	feeling	of	detachment	between	a	member	state	and	the	EU	can	do	to	EU	support	in	that	country.		
THE	FRENCH	REPUBLIC		 France	has	enjoyed	status	as	a	European	power	following	its	victory	with	the	allies	in	World	War	II,	which	gave	it	a	seat	of	power	in	the	European	Union.	France	also	has	one	of	the	largest	economies	in	the	EU,	which	bolsters	its	position	of	influence	in	the	EU.	Initially,	France	was	determined	to	exert	its	power	in	the	EU,	largely	to	counteract	the	influence	of	Germany	following	World	War	II;	however,	in	recent	years,	France	has	seen	a	significant	uptick	in	Euroscepticism	and	an	increasing	opposition	to	the	EU.			 In	order	to	understand	the	current	rise	of	nationalist	sentiments	in	France,	it	is	first	necessary	to	understand	French	history	and	culture—especially	the	significance	of	the	Algerian	War.	Algeria	had	been	a	French	protectorate	since	the	1830’s	and	became	a	true	colony	in	the	1900’s;	however,	Algeria	was	viewed	as	more	than	simply	a	colony,	it	was	viewed	as	part	of	France.		These	views	began	to	change	in	the	early	1900’s,	as	the	Algerian	natives	increased	resistance	against	exploitation	by	the	French.	The	movement	culminated	in	the	Algerian	War	of	Independence,	which	was	fought	from	1954	until	1962,	coinciding	with	the	waning	of	colonialism	following	WWII.136	The	historically	relationship	between	the	primarily	country	of	Christian	France	and	its	primarily	Muslim	former	colony	of	Algeria	led	to	lasting	consequences	for	France,	as	it	contributed	to	significant	Muslim	minority	population	in	France.	Today,	France	has	approximately	4.7	million	Muslims	(7.5%	of	its																																																									136	Curtius,	Quintus.	"The	Algerian	War	Of	Independence:	Lessons	For	Today	A	key	conflict	in	20th	century	military	history."	August	17,	2017.	Accessed	April	08,	2017.	http://www.returnofkings.com/69318/the-algerian-war-of-independence.	
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population),	which	is	one	of	the	largest	Muslim	populations	in	the	EU.137	While	France	is	largely	tolerant	of	this	diversity,	there	is	still	a	significant	gap	between	the	French	Catholic	majority,	and	the	Muslim	minority.	Many	of	the	Muslim	descendants	living	in	France	following	the	Algerian	war	feel	“excluded	from	mainstream	society	because	of	their	Arabic	names	or	the	color	of	their	skin.”138	This	degree	of	separation	is	only	increased	by	the	French	emphasis	on	secularity,	when	has	recently	reached	the	news	for	many	legal	challenges	for	public	displays	of	faith—especially	those	of	Muslims—such	as	women	wearing	veils.			 France	has	experienced	multiple	terrorist	attacks	by	Muslim	extremists	in	recent	years.	These	attacks	have	had	a	significant	effect	on	France,	which	already	struggles	from	Muslim	tensions,	as	many	French	now	perceive	the	EU	as	“incapable	of	ensuring	security	within	its	territory	and	to	control	the	external	borders	and	to	regulate	migration	flows.”139	The	French	are	also	reacting	against	the	refugee	crisis,	with	a	recent	Elabe	poll	finding	that	58%	of	French	citizens	opposed	to	allowing	refugees	into	its	country.	Additionally,	many	French	people	feel	that	“EU	membership…	has	grown	with	the	disappointments,	mainly	economic,”	especially	following	the	recession	and	debt	crisis.140			 These	issues	have	contributed	to	growing	levels	of	Euroscepticism	in	France.	40%	of	French	citizens	think	the	EU	has	more	drawbacks	than	advantages,	with	only	26%	thinking	the	opposite.	In	2015,	the	National	Front	(FN)	political	party	that	champions	Euroscepticism	picked	up	6.8	million	votes	in	regional	elections.	Additionally,	a	poll	by	the																																																									137	Hackett,	Conrad.	"5	facts	about	the	Muslim	population	in	Europe."	July	19,	2016.	Accessed	April	08,	2017.	http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/19/5-facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-europe/.	138	Power,	Carla.	"Charlie	Hebdo:	The	Tension	Between	France	And	Its	Muslim	Population."	January	8,	2015.	Accessed	April	08,	2017.	http://time.com/3659241/paris-terror-attack-muslim-islam/.	139	"French	are	'even	more	anti-EU	than	the	Brits'"	February	30,	2016.	Accessed	April	8,	2017.	http://www.thelocal.fr/20160330/france-home-to-more-eurosceptics-than-the-uk	.	140	"French	are	'even	more	anti-EU	than	the	Brits'"	
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University	of	Edinburgh	found	that	that	majority	of	French	citizens	want	to	follow	Britain	and	hold	a	referendum	on	France’s	EU	membership.141	Both	of	these	facts	provide	evidence	of	significant	levels	of	Euroscepticism	in	France.			 As	France	has	its	presidential	elections	this	year,	and	the	presidential	elections	essentially	test	public	support	for	the	EU.	The	two	individuals	advancing	from	the	first	round	of	elections	are	Marine	Le	Pen	of	the	National	Front	Party	and	Emmanuel	Macron	of	the	En	Marche!	Party.		Le	Pen	is	a	severe	Eurosceptic,	determined	to	hold	a	referendum	for	France	EU	membership	if	she	wins.	Macron	is	generally	in	support	of	the	EU	and	emphasizes	working	with	the	EU	to	reform	in	response	to	the	challenges	it	faces.				 In	the	past	few	years,	Marine	Le	Pen	of	the	National	Front	(FN)	party	has	gained	significant	prominence.	She	came	in	second	place	for	the	first	round	of	presidential	elections	with	21.5%	of	the	vote,	only	2.3%	behind	Macron,	the	first	place	finisher.142	Most	polls	predict	that	Le	Pen	will	be	“defeated	in	the	7	May	run-off,”	but	her	second	place	finish	in	the	first	round	of	presidential	elections	suggest	that	her	views	resonate	with	many	French	citizens.143	The	FN	party	has	historically	been	far	right,	and	was	previously	led	by	Marine	Le	Pen’s	father,	who	is	widely	identified	as	a	racist.	Under	him,	the	party	denied	the	holocaust	and	largely	supported	xenophobia.	Marine	Le	Pen	has	shifted	the	party	and	split	with	some	of	her	father’s	views,	although	the	party	still	champions	French	nationalism.	Her	opposition	to	immigration,	hard	stance	on	Islamic	extremism,	Euroscepticism	seem	to	have	taken	hold	with	many	of	the	French	citizens.																																																										141	"French	are	'even	more	anti-EU	than	the	Brits'"	142	Kirk,	Ashley,	and	Patrick	Scott.	"French	presidential	election:	Polls	and	odds	tracker."	The	Telegraph.	April	29,	2017.	Accessed	April	29,	2017.	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/french-presidential-election-poll-tracker-odds/. 143	Henley,	Jon.	"Marine	Le	Pen	promises	liberation	from	the	EU	with	France-first	policies."	The	Guardian.	February	05,	2017.	Accessed	April	08,	2017.	https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/05/marine-le-pen-promises-liberation-from-the-eu-with-france-first-policies.	
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Le	Pen	champions	many	historically	right	views	and	she	“envisions	a	France	with	closed	borders,	its	own	currency,	and	tough	immigration	controls;	a	country	that	is	independent	of	international	bodies	like	NATO,	and	one	that	ultimately	puts	itself	first.”	Indeed,	“France	First”	has	been	a	rallying	cry	for	Le	Pen	and	her	supporters,	especially	in	regards	to	the	EU.	The	FN	party	and	Le	Pen	pledge	that	if	they	gain	power	they	will	“take	France	out	of	the	Eurozone	and	–	unless	the	EU	agrees	to	revert	to	a	loose	coalition	of	nations	with	neither	a	single	currency	nor	a	border-free	area	–	to	hold	a	referendum	on	France’s	EU	membership.”144	Under	Le	Pen,	the	party	(and	the	Euroscepticism	the	party	champions)	has	gained	support,	growing	from	18%	support	in	2010	to	24%	support	today.145		 Le	Pen	has	tapped	into	not	only	a	form	of	French	nationalism	that	champions	Euroscepticism,	but	also	a	form	of	French	nationalism	that	promotes	pride	in	a	“true”	cultural	French	identity.	She	maintains	that	cultural	practices	that	differ	from	the	accepted	mainstream	in	France	–especially	those	of	France’s	Muslim	population	such	as	veils,	mosques,	or	public	prayer—are	threats	to	France	that	“no	French	person	…	attached	to	his	dignity	can	accept.”146	This	adds	a	new	layer	of	insight	to	Le	Pen’s	“France	first”	motto,	which	perhaps	would	be	better	articulated	as	“native	French	first.”147	This	narrow	view	of	a	French	identity	also	sheds	light	on	reasons	for	the	FN	brand	of	Euroscepticism,	as	a	European	identity	could	also	be	seen	as	a	threat	to	a	“true”	French	identity.			 While	Le	Pen’s	popularity	has	risen,	her	primary	challenger	seems	to	be	Emmanuel	
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Macron,	who	came	in	first	place	in	the	first	round	of	the	presidential	election	with	23.8%	of	the	vote.148	Many	polls	suggest	that	he	will	win	over	Le	Pen	in	the	May	7th	run-off.	149	Nonetheless,	Macron	faces	an	uphill	battle	as	he	runs	as	an	independent	liberal	centrist.		While	Macron	recognizes	some	flaws	in	the	EU,	he	is	committed	to	reforming	the	EU	for	stronger	economic	growth	and	to	ensure	that	the	EU	continues	to	prioritize	social	concerns.	He	champions	reforms	for	a	less	austerity-focused	Eurozone	and	refuses	to	re-impose	internal	borders	with	fellow	EU	members.150	As	such,	the	vote	between	Le	Pen	and	Macron	is	effectively	a	vote	between	opposing	the	EU	due	to	its	failures,	or	supporting	the	EU	by	committing	to	work	to	improve	its	current	flaws.			 It	is	clear	that	the	2017	election	in	France	is	largely	based	on	the	views	of	the	French	people	toward	the	EU.	Through	their	vote,	the	people	must	show	if	they	support	the	EU	and	European	integration,	or	if	Euroscepticism	combined	with	French	nationalism	will	be	victorious.	Le	Pen’s	motto	of	placing	(native)	France	first	and	her	high	degree	of	opposition	to	the	EU	suggest	that	is	isn’t	simply	the	threats	of	terrorism,	immigration,	and	economic	costs	that	guide	the	rise	in	French	Euroscepticism.	In	France,	even	to	a	higher	degree	than	in	the	UK	and	most	certainly	more	so	than	Germany,	the	EU	has	recently	been	viewed	as	a	threat	to	the	French	identity	and	national	interests.	The	French	have	a	history	of	pride	in	their	culture	and	values,	one	that	supranationalism	and	the	integration	is	promotes	appear	to	be	threatening	in	the	eyes	of	the	people.		It	is	even	plausible	that	the	French	feel	a	level	of	detachment	from	the	EU,	due	to	the	large	influence	of	Merkel	and	Germany	in	the	EU.	Le																																																									148	Kirk,	Ashley,	and	Patrick	Scott.	"French	presidential	election:	Polls	and	odds	tracker."	149	"French	election	2017:	Who	are	the	candidates?"	BBC	News.	March	20,	2017.	Accessed	April	08,	2017.	http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38220690.	150	Kettle,	Martin.	"An	Emmanuel	Macron	victory	would	give	the	EU	a	chance	to	save	itself	|	Martin	Kettle."	The	Guardian.	February	09,	2017.	Accessed	April	08,	2017.	https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/feb/09/emmanuel-macron-france-reform-eu-britain.	
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Pen	taps	into	fears	about	the	EU	threatening	the	French	identity	and	national	interests	when	she	claims,	“what	is	at	stake	in	this	election	is	the	continuity	of	France…	our	existence	as	a	people.”151	Yet,	Macron’s	popularity	provides	evidence	that	there	is	still	significant	support	for	the	EU	within	France.	In	essence,	the	French	people	will	have	to	vote	in	favor	of	the	EU	and	integration,	or	against	it	in	favor	of	Euroscepticism.	The	decision	of	the	French	people	will	have	extreme	significance	for	the	future	of	the	EU,	as	French	has	historically	been	one	of	the	most	powerful	countries	in	the	EU.	If	Macron	wins,	the	EU	has	a	chance	at	surviving	and	perhaps	improving	its	effectiveness	and	increasing	integration;	but	if	Le	Pen	wins	many	people	fear	that	her	victory	could	lead	to	a	French	departure	from	the	EU,	which	could	spark	further	disintegration	within	the	EU.152	
CONNECTING	EUROPEAN	CHALLENGES	TO	LEGITIMACY	
	In	the	United	Kingdom,	France,	and	Germany—arguably	the	three	most	powerful	nations	in	the	European	Union—recent	years	have	been	marked	by	a	significant	increase	in	Euroscepticism.	In	the	UK,	these	sentiments	resulted	in	a	referendum	to	leave	the	EU,	which	received	a	majority	of	votes	and	since	then	has	triggered	proceedings	for	the	UK	to	leave	the	EU	under	Article	50	of	the	Lisbon	Treaty.	Germany	remains	the	most	in	favor	of	the	EU	of	these	three	countries,	but	it	has	still	experienced	an	increase	in	nationalism	and	Euroscepticism	with	the	increasing	popularity	of	the	AFD	Party.	France	has	seen	a	significant	rise	in	Euroscepticism	with	a	dramatic	increase	for	support	for	Marine	Le	Pen	and	the	ultra-nationalist	FN	party,	which	calls	for	France	to	hold	a	similar	referendum	as	
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the	UK	to	leave	the	EU.	While	it	is	unlikely	that	Le	Pen	will	ultimately	win	the	election,	the	dramatic	increase	in	support	for	her	ideas	must	be	considered.		Ultimately,	the	increase	of	Euroscepticism	in	these	three	countries	and	across	Europe	can	be	traced	directly	to	concerns	over	refugees	and	immigration,	security	concerns	related	to	terrorism,	and	economic	stressors	from	the	recent	financial	crisis	and	the	resulting	European	debt	crisis.	The	inability	of	the	EU	to	respond	to	these	issues	effectively	has	shed	doubt	on	the	output	legitimacy	of	the	EU.		These	challenges	also	reveal	underlying	issues	in	the	input	legitimacy	of	the	EU.	The	case	studies	of	France	and	the	UK	highlighted	how	a	weak	European	identity	or	a	strong	national	identity	relative	to	a	European	identity	can	lead	to	Euroscepticism.153	Through	the	case	study	on	France,	it	also	seems	plausible	that	a	sense	of	detachment	or	lack	of	trust	can	also	lead	to	Euroscepticism.	Finally,	the	German	analysis	showed	how	conflict	over	the	purpose	of	the	EU	is	present,	even	in	a	country	that	is	largely	in	favor	of	the	EU,	which	undermined	the	input	legitimacy	of	the	EU.		For	the	EU	to	survive	through	these	challenges	(as	many	believe	that	the	EU	is	truly	at	a	significant	point	in	its	history	that	has	the	power	to	shape	or	destroy	the	EU)	it	is	clear	that	the	EU	must	change.	Considering	the	underlying	issues	with	input	legitimacy	and	output	legitimacy,	the	EU	must	do	more	than	simply	develop	a	coherent	and	effective																																																									153	While	some	countries	may	have	always	had	weak	European	identities	like	the	UK,	it	also	seems	that	that	costs	of	supranationalism	are	now	being	realized	more	so	than	they	have	been	in	the	past.	These	costs	can	include	financial	costs	(such	as	providing	loans	to	other	economically	struggling	EU	countries	or	financial	support	to	care	for	refugees)	or	the	costs	can	be	indirect	costs	(such	as	the	costs	that	stem	from	security	concerns	from	open	borders	in	an	age	of	terrorism.)	Regardless,	these	perceived	costs	appear	to	be	creating	an	“us	versus	them”	mindset	within	the	European	Union,	as	national	interests	seem	to	be	in	misaligned	with	European	integration.		These	newly	visible	costs	bolster	national	identities	relative	to	a	European	identity.	Presumably,	the	perceived	conflict	would	be	to	a	lesser	degree	if	the	European	identity	was	stronger,	based	on	Social	Identity	Theory.	Regardless	of	if	the	source	of	a	weak	European	identity	was	historically	present	or	newly	brought	on	due	to	the	perceived	costs	of	supranationalism,	it	still	undermines	the	input	legitimacy	of	the	EU.		
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solution	to	the	three	aforementioned	issues	Europe	faces,	but	it	must	do	so	in	a	way	that	addresses	the	underlying	legitimacy	issues	of	the	EU,	builds	trust	in	the	EU	from	its	citizens,	and	communicates	the	value	of	the	EU.154	
	 	
																																																								154	Santa	Fe	Institute.	"In-group	Altruism	And	Hostility	Toward	Outsiders	Evolved	Together."	ScienceDaily.	www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/10/071026173536.htm	(accessed	April	8,	2017).	
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CHAPTER	4:	THE	FUTURE	OF	THE	EUROPEAN	UNION	
	 The	European	Union	is	nothing	more	and	nothing	less	than	what	its	member	states	desire	it	to	be.	While	there	have	always	been	disagreements	surrounding	the	power	and	domain	of	the	EU,	today	its	very	existence	is	called	into	question	as	the	Eurosceptic	movement	has	gained	unprecedented	prominence.	In	March	of	2017,	the	Commission	published	the	White	Paper	on	the	Future	of	Europe,	which	reflects	on	the	state	of	the	EU	and	identifies	five	different	scenarios	for	the	EU	by	2025	(see	Appendix	7).	This	document	is	particularly	important,	as	it	shows	that	the	EU	itself	is	uncertain	about	its	very	future.155	The	EU	seems	to	recognize	that	for	the	first	time	in	its	history	the	very	existence	of	the	EU	is	being	questioned,	which	necessitates	change	within	the	EU.		
THE	FIVE	(SIX?)	FUTURES	OF	EUROPE	The	first	of	the	five	scenarios	proposed	by	the	Commission	in	its	white	paper	was	dubbed	“Carrying	On.”	In	this	scenario,	the	EU	will	continue	to	exist	and	function	as	it	has	done	since	its	creation.	It	will	continue	working	in	the	same	areas	at	the	same	rate	of	(relatively	slow)	progress.156	While	this	was	listed	as	an	option,	the	fact	that	the	EU	now	questions	its	future	makes	it	seem	as	if	simply	carrying	on	is	impossible	and	that	change	is	necessary.	The	second	of	the	five	scenarios	is	called	“nothing	but	the	single	market.”	As	the	name	suggests,	this	path	consists	of	dialing	back	or	erasing	all	social	or	political	areas	the	EU	currently	addresses.	Instead,	the	EU	will	only	focus	on	facilitating	the	single	market	
																																																								155	European	Commission.	White	Paper	on	the	Future	of	Europe:	Reflections	and	Scenarios	for	the	EU27	by	
2025.	By	Jean-Claude	Juncker.	Brussels,	Belgium:	European	Commission,	2017.	156	European	Commission.	White	Paper	on	the	Future	of	Europe:	Reflections	and	Scenarios	for	the	EU27	by	
2025.	
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between	member	states.157	This	could	decrease	some	of	the	political	areas	of	tension,	but	it	seems	to	give	up	on	the	historical	vision	of	a	unified	Europe.	While	this	may	be	the	ideal	option	for	some	member	states,	it	seems	that	the	desire	for	integration	is	stronger	in	other	member	states,	such	that	this	option	is	seems	unlikely.		The	third	scenario	is	one	in	which	“those	who	want	more	do	more.”	In	this	situation,	there	is	flexibility	in	what	the	EU	facilitates	for	its	member	states.	For	more	advance	measures	of	integration,	member	states	are	free	to	opt	in	or	to	opt	out	as	they	so	choose.	Presumably,	some	member	states	will	work	for	more	advanced	social	or	political	policies,	whereas	other	member	nations	will	restrict	their	involvement	in	the	EU	to	purely	economic	aspects.	While	it	was	not	addressed	in	the	white	paper,	many	argue	that	this	approach	has	indeed	been	a	part	of	the	EU	all	along,	as	member	states	have	chosen	to	opt	into	agreements	like	the	Euro	and	the	Schengen	agreement,	but	it	is	not	universally	mandated.158	Perhaps	this	option	would	encourage	flexibility	in	levels	of	integration	more	so	than	the	EU	has	done	historically,	although	it	always	has	to	an	extent.	This	future	seems	to	be	one	of	the	more	feasible	options	largely	due	to	the	fact	that	flexible	levels	of	integration	have	a	historical	basis	in	the	EU,	such	that	this	option	almost	seems	inevitable	if	the	EU	survives.	The	fear	some	states	have	for	this	option	is	that	it	would	lead	to	“tiers”	of	members	where	not	all	member	state	are	equal;	however,	because	participation	in	each	step	of	integration	is	up	to	each	member	state	(as	opposed	to	dictated	by	the	EU),	this	does	not	seem	to	be	a	rational	fear.159																																																									157	European	Commission.	White	Paper	on	the	Future	of	Europe:	Reflections	and	Scenarios	for	the	EU27	by	
2025.		158	European	Commission.	White	Paper	on	the	Future	of	Europe:	Reflections	and	Scenarios	for	the	EU27	by	
2025.		159	European	Commission.	White	Paper	on	the	Future	of	Europe:	Reflections	and	Scenarios	for	the	EU27	by	
2025.		
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The	fourth	scenario	is	one	where	the	EU	focuses	on	“doing	less	more	efficiently.”	In	this	scenario,	the	common	standards	are	reduced,	but	efficiency	and	enforcement	of	the	EU	in	the	areas	where	does	focus	are	improved.160		This	seems	plausible,	as	it	could	increase	the	output	legitimacy	of	the	EU	if	it	is	able	to	have	a	visible	impact	by	focusing	on	fewer	areas	with	the	same	amount	of	resources.	The	difficulty	in	this	option	would	on	identifying	the	areas	where	the	EU	should	focus	and	the	areas	from	which	the	EU	should	step	back.			The	final	option	identified	by	the	Commission	is	where	the	EU	proceeds	by	“doing	much	more	together.”	In	this	future,	all	forms	of	integration	increase	to	create	a	stronger	and	more	efficient	union.161	This	option	reflects	the	historical	vision	of	the	EU	for	a	high	level	of	integration	and	unity,	although	it	seems	unlikely	given	the	resistance	to	the	current	level	of	integration.	Although	it	was	not	stated	in	the	white	paper	(as	doing	so	would	be	a	nightmare	from	a	publicity	standpoint)	a	sixth	possible	future	for	Europe	would	be	the	dissolution	of	the	EU.	From	interviews	of	EU	officials,	it	seems	that	many	acknowledge	that	the	existence	of	the	EU	cannot	be	taken	for	granted	as	its	existence	truly	is	under	question.	The	EU	could	be	tipped	toward	this	future	based	on	the	French	election,	Brexit,	the	global	economy,	or	any	number	of	factors.	However,	it	seems	that	the	true	dissolution	of	the	EU	is	unlikely.	Even	if	the	EU	as	it	currently	exists	fails,	it	is	plausible	that	a	similar	entity	would	take	its	place,	such	that	there	would	still	be	some	degree	of	European	integration.	This	would	presumable	only	include	the	countries	that	are	largely	in	favor	of	the	EU,	such	as	Germany,	to	the	point	that	it	could	have	reduced	conflict	over	the	level	of	integration.	Nonetheless,																																																									160	European	Commission.	White	Paper	on	the	Future	of	Europe:	Reflections	and	Scenarios	for	the	EU27	by	
2025.		161	European	Commission.	White	Paper	on	the	Future	of	Europe:	Reflections	and	Scenarios	for	the	EU27	by	
2025.	
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the	dissolution	of	the	EU	as	it	stands	today	is	largely	considered	a	possibility	that	must	be	addressed.			While	the	future	ahead	is	uncertain,	a	few	things	are	clear.	The	first	is	the	fact	that	the	EU	itself	seems	to	recognize	that	its	very	existence	cannot	be	taken	for	granted.	The	EU	acknowledges	that	the	path	it	is	on	today	requires	some	form	of	change.	The	primary	question	is	what	changes	should	occur.	Through	interviews	of	EU	officials,	it	seems	that	those	who	are	optimistic	about	the	future	of	the	EU	generally	view	“doing	much	more	together,”	as	the	ideal;	but,	they	recognize	that	it	is	unrealistic	given	the	current	climate.	Instead,	the	best	path	for	the	EU	from	an	optimistic	viewpoint	seems	to	be	either	allowing	multiple	levels	of	participation	in	line	with	the	“those	who	want	more	do	more”	scenario	(which	arguably	is	the	same	as	“carrying	on”)	or	focusing	on	“doing	less	more	efficiently.”	It	is	worth	noting	that	these	options	are	not	in	contradiction,	such	that	it	is	possible	to	do	a	combination	of	these	two	options.	Those	who	are	less	optimistic	about	the	future	of	the	EU	recognize	that	it	has	a	chance	of	falling	apart,	and	at	best	being	just	a	single	market.	162	It	seems	difficult	to	imagine	Europe	without	some	form	of	integration,	and	many	countries	such	as	Germany	still	seem	to	value	European	integration;	yet,	the	increase	in	Euroscepticism	is	undeniable.	For	this	reason,	it	seems	that	the	“those	who	want	more	do	more”	scenario	is	not	only	the	most	optimistic,	but	also	the	most	probable.			To	a	significant	degree,	the	future	of	the	EU	depends	on	events	that	are	out	of	its	direct	control.	Specifically,	the	future	of	the	EU	depends	on	the	outcome	of	the	French	election,	as	Le	Pen	winning	would	be	a	genuine	threat	to	the	survival	of	the	EU.																																																									162	Interviews	with	EU	officials,	March	13-17,	2017.	(see	Appendix	6)		
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Additionally,	the	future	of	the	EU	depends	on	the	outcome	of	the	German	election.	While	neither	leading	candidate	would	be	a	threat	to	the	EU,	Schulz	would	perhaps	be	more	aggressive	in	pursuing	integration,	which	could	benefit	the	EU.	Additionally,	the	future	depends	on	the	outcome	of	the	Brexit	negotiations.	While	the	EU	does	have	a	say	in	how	these	negotiations	continue,	the	final	outcome	is	equally	at	the	hands	of	the	British.	If	Britain	ultimately	leaves	the	EU	(as	it	appears	it	will)	and	Britain	prospers,	this	could	cause	a	domino	effect	where	other	member	states	will	attempt	to	leave	the	EU;	however,	if	Britain	leaves	and	suffers	hardships	outside	the	EU,	the	chance	of	other	states	desiring	to	leave	decreases.	Additionally,	there	is	a	chance	the	negotiations	never	finish	and	Britain	either	remains	or	exists	in	a	permanent	state	of	limbo,	which	would	also	have	complications.	The	future	of	the	EU	also	depends	on	the	global	economy,	as	an	economic	downturn	would	almost	certainly	lead	to	increased	opposition	to	the	EU,	as	the	people	would	perceive	the	ability	of	the	EU	to	create	economic	prosperity	as	lacking.	Finally,	the	future	of	the	EU	depends	on	the	actions	of	Russia.	If	the	Russian	threat	increases,	then	the	EU	member	states	will	probably	turn	to	each	other	to	bolster	their	combined	strength	in	opposition	to	Russia,	which	would	potentially	foster	European	integration	through	the	EU.		To	a	lesser	degree,	the	increasing	threat	of	China	and	the	tension	between	Europe	and	the	United	States	under	President	Trump	could	also	have	a	similar	effect	of	strengthening	the	EU	due	to	a	need	to	find	strength	in	numbers.163	While	these	events	are	largely	out	of	the	control	of	the	EU,	the	EU	can	take	steps	to	protect	its	future	by	resolving	its	input	legitimacy	and	output	legitimacy	issues.		
																																																								163	Interviews	with	EU	officials,	March	13-17,	2017.	(see	Appendix	6)	
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RESOLVING	THE	LEGITIMACY	CRISIS		 While	the	future	of	the	EU	is	impacted	by	factors	outside	of	the	direct	control	of	the	EU,	the	future	of	the	EU	primarily	depends	on	the	actions	of	the	EU	and	its	member	states.	Therefore,	it	is	necessary	to	investigate	what	the	EU	can	do	to	resolve	its	current	crisis	of	input	and	output	legitimacy	(see	Appendix	8),	as	the	lack	of	legitimacy	is	the	primary	underlying	reason	for	the	recent	rise	in	Euroscepticism.	If	the	EU	can	sufficiently	respond	to	its	crisis	in	input	legitimacy	and	output	legitimacy,	it	can	significantly	bolster	its	support	and	improve	its	chances	of	survival.		
CREATING	OUTPUT	LEGITIMACY	First,	the	EU	needs	to	create	output	legitimacy,	as	output	legitimacy	is	easier	to	create	in	the	short-term	than	input	legitimacy.	The	most	visible	way	the	EU	can	foster	output	legitimacy	is	by	effectively	responding	to	the	three	major	issues	confronting	Europe.	Specifically,	the	EU	must	take	significant	strides	at	promoting	economic	growth	and	stabilizing	the	debt	crisis,	responding	to	the	refugee	crisis	and	migration	concerns,	and	effectively	fighting	terrorism.	While	the	economy	is	subject	to	international	market	forces,	the	EU	must	do	what	it	can	to	grow	the	European	economy,	create	jobs,	and	improve	the	standards	of	living.	As	migration	relating	to	the	refugee	crisis	has	been	of	top	concern	for	member	states,	the	EU	must	find	a	solution	to	decrease	the	migration	flow	into	Europe	and	better	respond	to	the	concerns	related	to	refugees	once	they	have	arrived	in	Europe.	While	the	Turkey	deal	was	a	good	start,	the	EU	must	do	more	so	that	the	pressures	of	migration	and	immigration	on	its	member	states	are	relieved.	Similarly,	the	EU	must	protect	its	border	security	and	share	intelligence	within	its	intelligence	communities	to	show	that	it	can	have	an	impact	in	fighting	terrorism.	In	summary,	the	EU	must	effectively	respond	to	
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the	three	major	issues	confronting	Europe,	as	this	is	important	to	restoring	its	actual	level	of	output	legitimacy.	If	the	EU	can	manage	to	effectively	respond	to	these	issues,	it	is	also	necessary	that	the	EU	communicate	its	actions	and	its	successes	to	the	people	so	that	it	is	also	perceived	as	having	output	legitimacy—as	actual	and	perceived	output	legitimacy	are	both	necessary.164		 In	addition	to	addressing	these	large	issues,	the	EU	must	also	have	tangible	impacts	on	the	individual	lives	of	European	citizens.	Its	efforts	to	create	tangible	value	for	individual	citizens	must	be	relevant,	enforced,	and	publicized.	For	example,	the	EU	worked	to	pass	legislation	to	reduce	data	roaming	charges	for	Europeans	visiting	other	EU	member	states,	so	it	must	work	with	member	states	to	ensure	that	this	legislation	is	enforced	and	must	work	with	the	member	states	to	get	credit	for	this	positive	impact	on	the	lives	of	Europeans.		This	legislation	is	important	first	step,	but	ultimately	the	EU	needs	to	find	more	areas	where	it	can	directly	have	an	impact	in	the	lives	of	the	people.	It	will	be	insufficient	for	the	EU	to	solely	address	tangible	issues	through	legislation	as	it	is	imperative	that	the	EU	ultimately	improves	cooperation	with	member	states	to	ensure	that	its	attempts	to	create	tangible	value	are	realized	through	proper	enforcement	and	publicized	as	EU	initiatives.165		
CREATING	INPUT	LEGITIMACY		 Simply	creating	output	legitimacy	is	not	enough	to	ensure	the	survival	of	the	EU	if	its	challenges	with	input	legitimacy	are	not	resolved.	While	the	input	legitimacy	challenges	will	take	longer	to	resolve	than	it	will	take	to	develop	output	legitimacy,	the	EU	must	still	
																																																								164	Interviews	with	EU	officials,	March	13-17,	2017.	(see	Appendix	6)	165	Interviews	with	EU	officials,	March	13-17,	2017.	(see	Appendix	6)	
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work	to	address	its	three	main	input	legitimacy	issues	of	an	unclear	purpose,	lack	of	a	European	identity,	and	detachment.	In	the	long	term,	the	EU	will	have	great	difficulty	surviving	if	it	lacks	input	legitimacy.		It	is	clear	that	the	initial	reason	for	the	EU’s	existence,	promoting	peace	through	economic	integration,	has	lost	power	as	the	memory	of	WWII	has	faded	and	a	European	war	seems	unimaginable	to	many.	Unfortunately,	the	peace,	prosperity,	and	stability	the	EU	has	fostered	are	not	irreversible.	The	EU	must	find	a	new	way	to	communicate	the	necessity	of	its	existence	to	the	people	and	the	member	state	governments.	While	output	legitimacy	can	and	should	be	one	source	of	justification,	the	EU	must	also	craft	a	powerful	and	relevant	narrative	that	can	supplement	peace	as	a	reason	for	its	existence.	Many	argue	that	simply	appealing	to	the	importance	of	solidarity	may	fill	this	void,	but	this	argument	seems	insufficient	to	appeal	to	all	people	and	nations.	In	fact,	it	seems	that	output	legitimacy	in	combination	with	appealing	to	the	value	of	solidarity	is	the	best	way	to	explain	the	purpose	of	the	EU.		European	citizens	identify	with	their	national	identity	before	they	identify	as	Europeans,	and	while	they	may	not	perceive	the	European	identity	as	being	in	conflict	with	their	national	identity	directly,	the	prioritization	of	national	identities	is	still	problematic	for	the	EU.	Over	a	long	period	of	time	with	increased	integration	it	might	be	possible	to	increase	the	strength	of	the	European	identity,	this	seems	unlikely	in	the	short	term.	Nonetheless,	the	EU	must	work	to	actively	promote	the	strengthening	of	a	single	European	identity,	perhaps	by	having	a	common	European	history	taught	in	schools.		As	establishing	the	reason	for	the	EU’s	existence	and	developing	a	European	identity	are	difficult	to	achieve	in	the	near	future,	the	most	important	way	the	EU	can	foster	input	
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legitimacy	for	itself	in	the	short	term	is	by	correcting	its	perceived	detachment	from	the	people.	The	first	aspect	of	its	detachment	is	the	source	of	democratic	deficit,	the	idea	that	the	EU	doesn’t	actually	represent	the	people	it	serves.	While	this	is	a	problem,	it	seems	that	the	people	don’t	care	about	this	particularly	if	the	EU	is	able	to	create	output	legitimacy	that	the	people	value.	The	bigger	problem	for	the	sense	of	EU	detachment	is	emotional,	and	the	EU	must	show	that	it	ultimately	deserves	the	trust	of	Europeans	and	is	in	touch	with	their	problems.	This	can	be	demonstrated	by	the	actions	the	EU	takes,	as	output	legitimacy	can	ultimately	foster	input	legitimacy	if	the	EU	makes	tangible	differences	in	the	lives	of	the	people	that	show	the	people	that	the	EU	genuinely	understands	their	problems	and	is	working	to	fix	them.	Of	course,	communication	will	also	play	a	role,	as	the	EU	must	get	credit	for	the	initiatives	it	creates	and	must	communicate	to	the	people	that	it	genuinely	tries	to	act	in	their	best	interest.		
IMPROVING	COMMUNICATION	Communication	plays	a	key	role	in	fostering	the	input	and	output	legitimacy	of	the	EU.	The	EU	must	be	credited	for	its	achievements	in	the	eyes	of	the	people	in	order	to	establish	output	legitimacy	and	communication	is	the	key	for	ensuring	this	happens.	Additionally,	communication	is	important	for	establishing	input	legitimacy	by	publicizing	the	purpose	of	the	EU,	working	to	promote	a	European	identity,	and	fostering	a	sense	of	connection	between	the	EU	and	its	people.	Unfortunately,	communication	is	currently	failing	in	most	every	aspect.	The	EU	has	minimal	forms	of	direct	communication	with	the	European	people	because	the	majority	of	communication	is	transmitted	through	national	or	local	channels.	Frequently	national	politicians	take	credit	for	the	actions	of	the	EU	that	align	with	national	interests	and	blame	the	EU	for	actions	that	don’t	go	along	with	national	
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interests	but	were	politically	necessary.	This	“blame	game”	has	largely	factored	into	the	input	legitimacy	problems	related	to	detachment,	but	also	factor	into	output	legitimacy	as	the	EU	doesn’t	get	credit	for	the	actions	it	takes.	While	it	is	almost	impossible	for	the	EU	to	develop	increased	direct	communication	with	Europeans	because	national	and	local	channels	have	higher	touch	with	citizens,	the	EU	should	work	to	do	so	to	the	limited	degree	it	can.	For	example,	the	EU	can	take	a	more	proactive	and	less	responsive	approach	to	media.	Even	more	importantly,	the	EU	must	work	with	national	government	to	improve	the	quality	and	accuracy	of	the	communication	citizens	receive	about	the	EU.166It	seems	that	many	national	governments	are	beginning	to	realize	that	the	“blame	game”	can	be	detrimental	to	them	in	the	long	term	as	motions	to	leave	the	EU	gain	strength,	putting	national	leaders	in	a	tough	spot	when	they	ultimately	know	that	the	EU	is	beneficial.		It	is	imperative	that	national	leaders	step	up	and	defend	the	EU,	as	ultimately	they	have	more	of	a	say	in	its	future	than	the	EU	itself	does.167		
HOPES	FOR	THE	FUTURE	OF	THE	EUROPEAN	UNION	
	This	paper	has	largely	addressed	the	many	shortcomings	of	the	European	Union	that	have	led	to	its	current	existential	crisis.	The	EU	has	very	real	problems	with	output	legitimacy	and	input	legitimacy,	which	is	must	correct.	For	the	European	Union	to	be	a	success,	it	must	be	efficiently	create	value	for	its	citizens	and	respond	to	the	major	challenges	Europe	currently	faces.	Additionally,	it	must	be	better	connected	to	its	people	and	have	a	clearer	purpose.	Finally,	promoting	a	stronger	European	identity	would	be	beneficial	at	increasing	solidarity	and	support	for	European	integration.	These	are	all	very	
																																																								166	Interviews	with	EU	officials,	March	13-17,	2017.	(see	Appendix	6)	167	Interviews	with	EU	officials,	March	13-17,	2017.	(see	Appendix	6)	
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significant	flaws	of	the	European	Union	that	must	be	corrected;	but,	in	spite	of	these	flaws,	the	European	Union	is	still	incredibly	valuable	for	Europe.	European	integration	through	the	EU	has	contributed	to	unprecedented	levels	of	peace,	stability,	and	economic	prosperity	in	the	European	subcontinent.	In	fact,	the	European	Union	received	a	Nobel	Peace	Prize	in	2012	for	its	role	in	promoting	“peace,	reconciliation,	democracy	and	human	rights	in	Europe.”168		Unfortunately,	the	EU	has	become	a	victim	of	its	prior	success	as	the	strides	the	EU	made	towards	promoting	peace	and	advancing	human	rights	are	now	taken	for	granted,	causing	the	very	existence	of	the	EU	to	be	called	into	question.	Europe	is	at	a	crossroads	and	it	is	clear	that	the	current	trajectory	of	the	EU	needs	to	change;	although	it	is	unclear	what	changes	will	or	should	be	made.		Europe	must	decide	the	future	it	desires,	but	there	are	compelling	reasons	why	Europe	should	choose	to	continue	striding	forward	with	European	integration.	169If	Europe	chooses	to	abandon	the	idea	of	a	European	Union,	its	choice	would	potentially	signify	a	turn	towards	a	less	peaceful	and	less	prosperous	future	for	Europe.	Abandoning	feelings	of	solidarity	and	increasing	barriers	to	trade	within	Europe	would	likely	lead	to	tensions	between	European	countries	that	could	go	unchecked	and	spark	conflict.	Even	without	considering	the	potential	for	conflict,	a	Europe	without	the	EU	would	risk	a	regression	from	the	strides	the	EU	has	made	toward	advancing	human	rights	and	democracy	within	Europe,	as	some	European	countries	are	still	working	on	establishing	these	values	and	would	have	
																																																								168	Anonymous.	"European	Union	receives	Nobel	Peace	Prize	2012."	EUROPA.	Accessed	April	29,	2017.	https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history/2010-today/2012/eu-nobel_en.	169	Interviews	with	EU	officials,	March	13-17,	2017.	(see	Appendix	6)	
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minimal	incentive	to	do	so	without	the	EU.170	Finally,	it	seems	likely	that	the	global	influence	of	Europe	on	international	affairs	would	decrease	substantially	without	the	EU,	given	that	no	single	European	country	rivals	the	economic	or	political	power	of	global	superpowers	like	the	United	States	or	China.	Therefore,	it	is	in	the	global	political	interest	of	Europe	for	the	EU	to	prosper.		It	is	in	the	best	interest	of	Europe	that	the	European	Union	survives	and	continues	to	foster	European	integration.	In	spite	of	its	many	flaws,	the	European	Union	plays	a	significant	role	in	promoting	peace,	democracy,	and	human	rights	within	Europe	and	these	values	are	worth	defending.	For	these	reasons,	the	European	Union	must	improve	its	levels	of	input	legitimacy	and	output	legitimacy	because	the	fate	to	the	European	Union	depends	on	its	ability	to	improve	its	legitimacy	in	the	eyes	of	its	people.		 	
																																																								170	Marthoz,	Jean-Paul.	"UN	review	of	Hungary	shows	country	'treats	human	rights	as	a	public	enemy'"	Committee	to	Protect	Journalists.	2016.	Accessed	April	29,	2017.	https://cpj.org/blog/2016/05/un-review-of-hungary-shows-country-treats-human-ri.php.		
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Appendix	1:	Timeline	of	European	Integration	
	"European	Disunion:	The	Rise	and	Fall	of	a	Post-War	Dream?	|	Origins:	Current	Events	in	Historical	Perspective."	Origins:	Current	Events	in	Historical	Perspective.	September	2013.	Accessed	April	08,	2017.	http://origins.osu.edu/article/european-disunion-rise-and-fall-post-war-dream/page/0/0.		 	
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Appendix	2:	Member	States	of	the	European	Union	
	"The	181st	Party:	the	European	Union."	The	181st	Party:	the	European	Union	|	CITES.	Accessed	April	08,	2017.	https://cites.org/eng/eu_181st_party.			 	
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Appendix	3:	EU	Institutions	
	"EU	Legislative	Process	Explained."	Financial	Markets	Toolkit.	Accessed	April	8,	2017.	https://financialmarketstoolkit.cliffordchance.com/en/topic-guides/eu-explained.html.		 	
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Appendix	4:	EU	Legislation	and	Budget	Creation	
	"The	European	Union."	Accessed	April	08,	2017.	http://www.tasc.ie/opengovtoolkit/public-decision-making/european-union/.			 	
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Appendix	5:	Cameron’s	EU	Deal	
	Dahlgreen,	Will.	"Draft	EU	deal	gives	boost	to	Leave	campaign."	February	4,	2016.	Accessed	April	08,	2017.	https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/02/04/eu-referendum-leave-leads-nine/.		
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Appendix	6:	Interview	Questions	for	EU	Officials	1. Please	describe	your	background	and	your	work	with	the	EU.	2. What	do	you	think	has	contributed	to	the	recent	increase	in	Euroscepticism?	3. How	do	you	think	that	the	EU	should	respond	to	the	issues	you	identified	as	contributing	to	Euroscepticism?	4. What	do	you	view	as	the	most	probable	future	for	Europe?	5. What	do	you	think	would	be	the	best	future	for	Europe?			These	questions	were	used	to	interviews	from	3/13/17-3/17/17	of	13	anonymous	people	who	were	closely	associated	with	the	European	Union.	Interviewees	were	connected	to	the	European	Commission,	permanent	representations	of	member	states	to	the	European	Union,	the	European	Parliament,	the	European	External	Action	Service,	and	think	tanks	studying	the	European	Union.		
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Appendix	7:	The	Five	Futures	of	Europe	
	European	Commission.	White	Paper	on	the	Future	of	Europe:	Reflections	and	Scenarios	for	
the	EU27	by	2025.	By	Jean-Claude	Juncker.	Brussels,	Belgium:	European	Commission,	2017.	
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Appendix	8:	The	Input	and	Output	Legitimacy	Crisis	of	the	EU		 	
EU	Legitimacy	Crisis	
Input	Legitimacy	challenges	
Lack	of	European	Identity	 Detachment	
Democratic	Deicit	 Emotional	detachment	
Unclear	purpose	
WWII	Peace	justiication	losing	relevance	
Communication	
Dependent	on	local/national	communication	methods		
"Blame	game"	with	national	governments	
Output	legitimacy	challenges	
Ineffective	on	European	wide	issues	
Refugee	Crisis	 Economic	recession	and	debt	crisis	 Increased	frequency	of	terrorist	attacks	
Ineffecient	at	an	individual	level	
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